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The Youth Discount:
Old Enough To Do The Crime,
Too Young To Do The Time
Barry C. Feld*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to the
entire category of juvenile offenders, repudiated its "death is different"
jurisprudence, and required states to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. Roper v. Simmons prohibited states from executing offenders for
murder they committed when younger than eighteen years of age.' Roper reasoned
that immature judgment, susceptibility to negative influences, and transitory
personalities reduced youths' culpability and barred the most severe sentence. 2
Graham v. Florida extended Roper's diminished responsibility rationale and
prohibited states from imposing life without parole (LWOP) sentences on youths
convicted of nonhomicide offenses, and repudiated the Court's earlier Eighth
Amendment position that "death is different."A Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
Hobbs [Miller/Jackson], combined Roper and Graham's diminished responsibility
rationale with another strand of death penalty jurisprudence to bar mandatory
LWOP sentences for youths convicted of murder,' required judges to make
individualized sentencing decisions, and emphasized the importance of
youthfulness as a mitigating factor.
Despite the Court's recognition of adolescents' reduced criminal
responsibility, Graham provided nonhomicide offenders very limited relief-
* Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1973. 1 am
grateful to Jamie Buskirk, Class of 2013, and Kiley Henry, Class of 2014, for outstanding research
assistance.
I Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2 Id. at 569-72.
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); see, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After
Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 765 (2011) (noting that "the Graham Court easily
applied to juvenile life without parole the developmental conclusions that had partially underlain its
earlier abolition of the juvenile death penalty.").
4 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (majority opinion); Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (finding "the mandatory scheme flawed
because it gave no significance to 'the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances' of the offense and 'exclud[ed] from consideration . . . the possibility of compassionate
or mitigating factors.').
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"some meaningful opportunity to obtain release." Similarly, Miller/Jackson only
required an individualized evaluation of culpability and consideration of the
mitigating qualities of youthfulness, but did not preclude an LWOP sentence for
juveniles who murder.
Roper and Graham's categorical treatment of adolescents' diminished
responsibility and Miller/Jackson's focus on the mitigating qualities of youth
provide the rationale for a Youth Discount-a proportional reduction of adult
sentence lengths based on the youth of the offender. A Youth Discount provides a
straightforward way for legislatures to recognize juveniles' categorically
diminished responsibility and formally to incorporate youthfulness as a mitigating
factor in sentencing. It requires only that legislators exhibit the political courage to
recognize, as has the Court, that "children are different" and deserve less severe
punishment than adults for their actions. Part II analyzes Roper's abolition of the
juvenile death penalty and reviews developmental psychological and neuroscience
research that bolster its conclusion that youths are less criminally responsible than
adults. Part III examines Graham's rejection of the Court's "death is different"
jurisprudence and reformulation of Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses to
accommodate the diminished responsibility of young nonhomicide offenders. Part
IV analyzes Miller/Jackson's repudiation of mandatory LWOP sentences for
juveniles who murder by using reasoning from the Court's death penalty
precedents to require individualized assessments and to weigh youthfulness
heavily. Part V proposes a Youth Discount to formally recognize youthfulness as a
mitigating factor. Legislators should use age as a conclusive proxy for diminished
responsibility and provide all young offenders with substantially shorter sentences.
II. ROPER V. SIMMONS AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
The Supreme Court had considered whether the Eighth Amendment
prohibited states from executing juvenile offenders prior to Roper v. Simmons.' In
1989, Stanford v. Kentucky upheld the death penalty for sixteen or seventeen year-
6 U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). Earlier decisions adverted to the importance of
considering youthfulness as a mitigating factor in capital sentencing. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (remanding sixteen-year-old defendant for resentencing after trial
court's failure properly to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor and noting that "youth is more
than a chronological fact" and "minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and
responsible than adults."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that fifteen-year-old offenders lacked culpability to warrant execution). Thompson's
proportionality analysis considered both objective factors-e.g., state statutes, jury practices, and the
views of national and international organizations-and the justices' own subjective sense of
"civilized standards of decency." Id. at 830. Thompson emphasized that deserved punishment must
reflect individual culpability and concluded that "[t]here is also broad agreement on the proposition
that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults." Id. at 834.
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old youths convicted of murder. In 2005, Roper overruled Stanford and
prohibited states from executing youths for crimes committed prior to eighteen
years of age. Roper relied on the analytic methodology the Court used earlier in
Atkins v. Virginia to bar execution of defendants with mental retardation. 9 Roper
found that state laws and jury decisions evidenced a national consensus against
executing juveniles.'o The Roper majority's proportionality analysis offered three
reasons why states could not punish juveniles as severely as adults." First,
juveniles' immature judgment and limited self-control cause them to act
impulsively and without full appreciation of consequences.12 Second, juveniles'
greater susceptibility to negative peer influences and inability to escape their
criminogenic environments reduce their responsibility.' 3 Third, their transitory
personality development provides less reliable evidence of depraved character.14
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375-76 (1989) (acknowledging that most juveniles
were less criminally responsible than adults, but rejecting a categorical ban and allowing juries to
decide whether a youth's culpability warranted execution).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (prohibiting execution of youths for crimes
committed when seventeen years of age or younger).
9 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring states from executing defendants
with mental retardation). Atkins found a national consensus existed because thirty states barred the
practice and few states actually executed offenders with mental retardation. Id. at 314-16 (counting
state statutes and emphasizing that "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change" that enabled the Court to find the existence of a
national consensus). The Atkins Justices' independent proportionality analysis concluded that
mentally impaired defendants lacked the culpability to warrant execution. Id. at 315-16.
Commentators noted the constitutional implications of Atkins' proportionality analyses for
executing juvenile offenders. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity
Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles From Capital Punishment, 33 N.M.
L. REv. 207, 207 (2003) (noting that "The Atkins decision . . . naturally raises the question: what
about juveniles?"); Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins
for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 463, 463-64 (2003) ("[T]he same
psychological and developmental characteristics that render mentally retarded offenders less
blameworthy than competent adult offenders also characterize the immaturity of judgment and
reduced culpability of adolescents and should likewise prohibit their execution.").
'o Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-66 (noting that legislative trends prohibiting executing children
corresponded with those in Atkins). See also Feld, supra note 9, at 489-98 (analogizing between
state laws and jury practices in executing defendants with mental retardation and juveniles).
1 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-72.
12 Id. at 569 ("[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often that in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.").
" Id. at 569-570 ("Juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure . . . Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.").
14 Id. at 570 ("[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.").
Because juveniles' character is transitional, "[flrom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a great possibility exists that a minor's
2013 109
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These developmental features-immature judgment, lack of self-control, and
susceptibility to social influences-also negated retributive and deterrent
justifications for the death penalty.' 5 As a result of Roper, states converted the
sentences of seventy youths on death row to life without the possibility of parole. 16
A. Categorical vs. Individual Diminished Responsibility
The Roper majority and dissents differed on several issues,17 but they
character deficiencies will be reformed." Id.
1s Id at 571. Roper noted the two penal functions served by the death penalty-retribution
and deterrence-and concluded that:
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt
to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong
with a minor as with an adult . . . Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity." Id.
Similarly, the Court concluded that juveniles' immaturity ofjudgment decreased the likelihood
that the threat of execution would deter them, arguing that "the absence of evidence of deterrent
effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than
adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence." Id.
16 See Elizabeth Cepparulo, Note, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life
Really Better than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 225, 225 (2006) (noting that the
impact of Roper was to convert capital sentences to sentences of life without the possibility of parole
because "[i]n many states, life without parole and death are the only two options when sentencing
homicide offenders."); see, e.g., Davis v. Jones, 441 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (finding
that defendant was seventeen-years-old at the time of his conviction and capital sentence, and, as a
result of Roper, "the sentence of death is no longer constitutionally valid, [so] the only sentencing
alternative is life without parole."); Duncan v. State, 925 So.2d 245, 281 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
(because of Roper, case remanded with instructions to "set aside the appellant's death sentence and
resentence him to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole"); Duke v. State, 922 So.2d
179, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that following Roper, the case of a sixteen-year-old
convicted of capital crime must be remanded "to set aside Duke's sentence of death and to resentence
him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole-the only other sentence available for a
defendant convicted of capital murder.").
17 The majority and dissents disagreed about the proper denominator to calculate the existence
of a national consensus against executing juveniles-all states or only those with death penalty laws.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 595-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 609-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that relevant states are those that employ the death penalty).
The majority and dissent also differed over the role of international law in interpreting the
Constitution. Compare id. at 575-78 (majority opinion) (referring to "the laws of other countries and
to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment"), with id at
604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging limited role of international law), and id. at 624
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the views of the rest of the world "ought to be rejected out of
hand").
The dissenters criticized the majority for failing to condemn the Missouri Supreme Court for
anticipatorily overruling Stanford. Id at 593-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's
failure to reprove Missouri Supreme Court for failing to follow Stanford); id. at 628-29 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that "the Court affirms the Missouri Supreme Court without even
admonishing that court for its flagrant disregard of our precedent in Stanford.").
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disagreed fundamentally whether to bar the death penalty categorically or to
evaluate youths' culpability individually. Justice Kennedy opted for a
categorical ban:
The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death
penalty despite insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likelihood
exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime
would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of
course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less
severe than death. 19
Clinicians do not diagnose people younger than eighteen with antisocial
personality disorder, and Roper declined to allow jurors to make culpability
assessments that clinicians eschew.20 The Court feared that a brutal murder could
overwhelm the mitigating role of youthfulness. 2' Roper used age as a conclusive
proxy for diminished responsibility to prevent jurors from treating youthfulness as
an aggravating factor.22
1s Compare id. at 572-73 (majority opinion) ("The differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death
penalty despite insufficient culpability"), with id. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]hese
[Eighth Amendment] concerns may properly be addressed not by means of an arbitrary, categorical
age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which juries are required to give
appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant's immaturity, his susceptibility to outside pressures,
his cognizance of the consequences of actions, and so forth."), and id at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[The majority's] startling conclusion undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing
system, which entrusts juries with 'mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy
codification and that buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system."' (quoting
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987))).
19 Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 573 (noting that psychologists cannot differentiate between an immature juvenile's
crime and the "rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.").
21 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination,
2005 SUP. CT. REv. 51, 83 (2005) (arguing that "to the extent we see or want to see childhood as a
time of innocence, cognitive dissonance may prompt us to reconceive a child who does terrible things
as an adult.").
22 Id. at 52 (noting that the prosecutor in Roper improperly argued the defendant's age was an
aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor); Norman J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and
Supreme Court Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 612, 636
(1995) (reporting social science studies showing that "[w]hen heinousness increases, it exerts a more
powerful effect than age").
Post-Roper commentators' vehement criticism bolsters the accuracy of Justice Kennedy's
intuition. See, e.g., Mitchel Brim, A Sneak Preview Into How the Court Took Away a State's Right to
Execute Sixteen and Seventeen Year Old Juveniles: The Threat of Execution Will No Longer Save an
Innocent Victim's Life, 82 DENv. U. L. REv. 739, 753 (2005) (describing horrific crimes committed
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B. Developmental Psychology and Adolescent Culpability
Roper's three justifications for adolescents' reduced culpability-immature
judgment, susceptibility to negative peer influences, and transitional identities-
relied more on intuition- "as any parent knows"23 -than on scientific evidence.24
Although amicus briefs presented developmental psychological and neuroscience
research, the Court did not analyze or identify the decisive evidence. 25
Roper analyzed youths' reduced culpability within a retributive sentencing
framework. Retributive sentencing theory proportions punishment to a crime's
seriousness. A crime's seriousness is defined by two elements-harm and
by juveniles and concluding that "[i]t is a grave injustice, not only to the victim and the victim's
family, but also to society as a whole . . . by not basing its decision on the respondent's moral
culpability but rather on the Justices' individual perceptions and biases"); Benyomin Forer,
Comment, Juveniles and the Death Penalty: An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of
Capital Punishment, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 161, 171-75, 180 (2006) (summarizing facts of egregious
cases); Steven J. Wernick, Constitutional Law: Elimination of the Juvenile Death Penalty-
Substituting Moral Judgment for a True National Consensus, 58 FLA. L. REV. 471 (2006); Moin A.
Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show that the Logic
of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More Than Adults, Ill PENN ST. L. REV.
53, 106 (2006) (arguing that if juveniles are immature, then "harsher punishments are needed to
control them.").
23 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (observing summarily that juveniles are immature, impulsive, and
irresponsible).
24 Id. at 617-19 (Scalia J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's selective and inconsistent use of
social science studies as "look[ing] over the heads of the crowd and pick[ing] out its friends");
Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379,
396 (2006) (noting that "the Court's use of social science research was, at times, limited and flawed.
Even when the Court attempts to examine research that is widely accepted and highly regarded, the
Court does not always appear to have the tools necessary to provide a sufficiently firm social sciences
foundation.").
25 Denno, supra note 24, at 382-87 (arguing that while the Court relies on the "scientific and
sociological studies respondent and his amici cite," it fails to identify which studies or data supported
its conclusions about the differences between adolescents and adults).
26 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN
AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONs 161 (2009) (arguing that "the
offender's blameworthiness for an offense is generally assessed according to two elements: the nature
and seriousness of the harm foreseeably caused or threatened by the crime and the offender's
culpability in committing the crime (in particular, the offender's degree of intent (mens rea), motives,
role in the offense, and mental illness or other diminished capacity.)"); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48 (1976) ("[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion
that his conduct was wrong and that he is blameworthy for having committed it."); Richard S. Frase,
Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality"
Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 589-91 (2005) [hereinafter Frase, Proportionality]
(summarizing principles of retributive sentencing theory); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE
AND SANCTIONS 15 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985).
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culpability-which determine how much punishment an actor deserves. 2 7
[T]he degree of blameworthiness of an offense is generally assessed
according to two kinds of elements: the nature and seriousness of the
harm caused or threatened by the crime; and the offender's degree of
culpability in committing the crime, in particular, his or her degree of
intent (mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other
diminished capacity.28
An offender's age has no bearing on the amount of harm caused-children
and adults can inflict the same injuries.29 But youths' inability fully to appreciate
wrongfulness or to control their behavior may reduce culpability and lessen
30blameworthiness for the harms they cause.
27 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
proportionality principle takes account not only of the 'injury to the person and to the public' caused
by a crime, but also of the 'moral depravity' of the offender." (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 598 (1977))); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the offender's culpability-"the degree of the defendant's blameworthiness"-is central to
determining the penalty); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without
Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 681, 707 (1998) ("[A] sentence must correspond to
the crime-not just to the harm caused by the offense, but also to the culpability of the offender.");
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 822 (2003)
[hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth] ("Only a blameworthy moral agent deserves
punishment at all, and blameworthiness (and the amount of punishment deserved) can vary
depending on the attributes of the actor or the circumstances of the offense."); Franklin E. Zimring,
Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished
Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("But
desert is a measure of fault that will attach very different punishment to criminal acts that cause
similar amounts of harm.").
28 Frase, Proportionality, supra note 26, at 590.
29 See, e.g., ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 174 (1975) (arguing that the victim
of a crime is just as victimized, regardless of the age of the perpetrator, and the need for social
defense is the same).
30 Just deserts theory and criminal law grading principles base the degree of deserved
punishment on the actor's culpability. For example, a person may cause the death of another
individual with premeditation and deliberation, intentionally, "in the heat of passion," recklessly,
negligently, or accidentally. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 105-45 (2d
ed. 1960). The criminal law treats the same objective harm-for example, the death of a person-
quite differently depending on the actor's culpability.
Offender culpability is central to ensuring rational and proportional sentencing. See Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (reasoning that "Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea
that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the
more severely it ought to be punished."); see also David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative
Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEx. L. REV.
1555, 1557 (2004) ("[J]uveniles tend to be less competent in discriminating right from wrong and in
being able to regulate successfully their actions in accord with these discriminations. If they are less
competent, then they are less responsible."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of
1132013
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Developmental psychology and neuroscience research inform how children's
thinking and behaving change and may influence criminal responsibility. ' By
mid-adolescence, most youths can distinguish right from wrong and reason
similarly to adults under controlled conditions. 3 2 But the ability to make good
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997) ("[Adolescents'] criminal choices are presumed less to express
individual preferences and more to reflect the behavioral influences characteristic of a transitory
developmental stage that are generally shared with others in the age cohort. This difference supports
drawing a line based on age, and subjecting adolescents to a categorical presumption of reduced
responsibility."); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A
Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 389,
407-09 (1999) (explaining that youths lack "the ability to control [their] impulses, to manage [their]
behavior in the face of pressure from others to violate the law, or to extricate [themselves] from a
potentially problematic situation," and that these deficiencies render them less blameworthy).
Zimring uses the term "diminished responsibility" to refer to adolescents who possess "the
minimum abilities for blameworthiness and thus for punishment ... [whose] immaturity . .. still
suggests that less punishment is justified." Zimring, supra note 27, at 273. See also FRANKLIN
ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 75 (1998) [hereinafter ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE]
(arguing that "even after a youth passes the minimum threshold of competence, this barely competent
youth is not as culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully
qualified adult offender."); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 830 (arguing that
compared with adults, youths act more impulsively, weigh consequences differently from adults, and
discount risks because of normal developmental processes that "undermine [their] decisionmaking
capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability").
31 See, e.g., Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 30, at 391:
Developmental psychology, broadly defined, concerns the scientific study of changes in
physical, intellectual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle. Developmental
psychologists are mainly interested in the study of 'normative' development (i.e., patterns of
behavior, cognition, and emotion that are regular and predictable within the vast majority of the
population of individuals of a given chronological age), but they are also interested in
understanding normal individual differences in development (i.e., common variations within
the range of what is considered normative for a given chronological age) as well as the causes
and consequences of atypical or pathological development (i.e., development that departs
significantly from accepted norms).
32 For example, adolescents and adults make informed consent medical decisions similarly.
See Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551, 617-21 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
cited research on adolescents' competence to make informed consent decisions in the context of
abortion); Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 52-
53 (1998) (concluding that cognitive capacity and formal reasoning ability of mid-adolescents does
not differ significantly from that of adults). Research on young peoples' ability to make informed
medical decisions tends to support equating adolescents' and adults' cognitive abilities. See Thomas
Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978) (finding that little research evidence exists to support that adolescents
aged fifteen or older possess less competence than adults to provide knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary informed consent); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children
and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1595 (1982) (noting
that fourteen-year-olds' choices did not differ significantly from those of adults in terms of "evidence
of choice, reasonable[ness of] outcome, rational[ity of] reason[ing], and understanding" when
responding to medical and psychological treatment hypotheticals). But see Elizabeth Cauffman et al.,
Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC
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choices under laboratory conditions differs from decisions made in stressful
circumstances with incomplete information. 3 Emotions, excitement, or stress
contribute to riskier decisions by youths than by adults.34
1. Immature Judgment and Self-Control
Developmental psychologists distinguish between youths' cognitive abilities
L. REV. 403, 406-07 (1999) (criticizing cognitive studies as methodologically limited and failing to
assess real-life decision-making); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (1992) (criticizing researchers who find no differences
between adolescents' and adults' decision-making for focusing too narrowly on cognitive as opposed
to judgmental factors).
3 See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1770 (1995) [hereinafter Cauffman &
Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences]; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 27, at 812-13 ("These
findings from laboratory studies are only modestly useful, however, in understanding how youths
compare to adults in making choices that have salience to their lives or that are presented in stressful
unstructured settings (such as the street) in which decision makers must rely on personal experience
and knowledge."); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 423 (2000) ("[T]he decision making capacity of
adolescents may be more vulnerable to disruption by the stresses and strains of everyday living than
that of adults. That is, unlike adults, adolescents may exhibit considerably poorer cognitive
performance under circumstances involving everyday stress and time-limited situations than under
optimal test conditions."); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 249, 250
(1996) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment] ("[T]he informed consent model is
too narrow in scope . .. because it overemphasizes cognitive functioning (e.g., capacity for thinking,
reasoning, understanding) and minimizes the importance of noncognitive, psychosocial variables that
influence the decision-making process (i.e., aspects of development and behavior that involve
personality traits, interpersonal relations, and affective experience)").
34 Researchers distinguish decisions made under conditions of "cold" and "hot" cognition.
See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 115, 119 (2007) ("[A]dolescents are much less capable of making sound decisions
when under stressful conditions or when peer pressure is strong. Psychosocial researchers have
referred to cognition in these different contexts as cold versus hot. The traits that are commonly
associated with being an adolescent-short-sightedness (i.e., inability to make decisions based on
long-term planning), impulsivity, hormonal changes, and susceptibility to peer influence-can
quickly undermine one's ability to make sound decisions in periods of hot cognition.") (citations
omitted); Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health
in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001) ("Cold cognition refers to thinking under
conditions of low emotion and/or arousal, whereas hot cognition refers to thinking under conditions
of strong feelings or high arousal. The cognitive processes involved in hot cognition may, in fact, be
much more important for understanding why people [-especially youths-] make risky choices in
real-life situations."); Bernd Figner et al., Affective and Deliberative Processes in Risky Choice: Age
Differences in Risk Taking in the Columbia Card Task, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 709, 726-28
(2009) (reporting that adolescents are more heavily influenced by the emotional limbic system and
make riskier decisions under stressful conditions); Scott, supra note 32, at 1645 (arguing that
youthfulness impairs consideration of alternatives or weighing and comparing consequences);
Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity ofJudgment, supra note 33, at 259 ("[S]ensation seeking increases
during adolescence, leading to increased risk taking as a means of achieving excitement.").
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and their judgment and self-control.35 Although mid-adolescents' cognitive
abilities are comparable with adults, their judgment and impulse control does not
emerge for several more years.36 Youths' immature judgment reflects differences
in risk perception, appreciation of future consequences, and experience with
autonomy.37 Youths' generic difference from adults in knowledge and experience,
time perspective, risk proclivity, and impulsivity renders their bad choices
categorically less blameworthy.
Adolescents underestimate risks and focus on short-term gains rather than
35 MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE JUSTICE,
DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL BLAMEWORTHINESS (2006), http://www.adjj.org/downloads (follow
"3030PPT- Adolescent . . >" hyperlink) [hereinafter MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK]
(reporting a disjunction between youths' cognitive ability and their maturity ofjudgment). "By age
16, individuals show adult levels of performance on tasks of basic information processing and logical
reasoning. Yet in the real world, adolescents show poorer judgment than adults." Id.
36 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 813 ("Psycho-social development
proceeds more slowly than cognitive development. As a consequence, even when adolescent
cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision making may still differ due to
immature judgment."); Elizabeth Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 224 (1995) [hereinafter Scott et al., Legal Contexts]; Kim
Taylor-Thompson, States ofMind/States ofDevelopment, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 152 (2003)
("[F]or all the importance of cognitive development, aspects of behavior that involve interpersonal
and affective experience may offer even more information about an adolescent's decision-making
processes.").
3 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 53 (1998) (describing characteristics of youths that distinguish their decision making capabilities
from those of adults); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 813 ("[E]ven when
adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision-making may still differ
due to immature judgment. The psycho-social factors most relevant to differences in judgment
include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal perspective, and
(d) capacity for self-management."); Scott et al., Legal Contexts, supra note 36, at 229-35
(describing psycho-social and developmental factors that contribute to juveniles' immature
judgment); Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation
of Youth Crime, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 20 (2008) (noting that "considerable evidence
supports the conclusion that children and adolescents are less capable decision makers than adults in
ways that are relevant to their criminal choices."); Steinberg & Cauffnan, Maturity ofJudgment,
supra note 33, at 252 (emphasizing temperance, perspective, and judgment as ways in which
adolescents' thinking diverges from adults).
38 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation
of Youth Crime, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 20 (2008) (suggesting that because youths assess
and weigh risks differently than adults, they are less likely to anticipate that someone might get hurt
or killed in the commission of a felony); Scott & Grisso, supra note 30, at 160-61 (noting that
psycho-social developmental factors affecting judgment and criminal responsibility in adolescents
include: "(1) conformity and compliance in relation to peers, (2) attitude toward and perception of
risk, and (3) temporal perspective"); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 27, at 813; Scott et al., Legal
Contexts, supra note 36, at 227 (proposing "judgment" framework to evaluate quality of adolescent
decision-making that includes not only cognitive capacity, but also influence of factors such as
"conformity and compliance in relation to peers and parents, attitude toward and perception of risk,
and temporal perspective").
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possible long-term losses to a greater extent than do adults.39 They possess less
information 40 and consider fewer options than do adults. 4 1 They weigh costs and
benefits differently than adults and apply different subjective values to outcomes.4 2
Youths crave sensation and excitement-the adrenaline rush-which increases
their propensity to engage in risky behaviors. 43 Risk-taking and sensation-seeking
peak around sixteen or seventeen-the ages when youths' involvement in criminal
activity also increases-and then decline in adulthood."
3 See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 19 (1992) ("[A]dolescents [may] judge some negative
consequences in the distant future to be of lower probability than do adults or to be of less importance
than adults do."); see also Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A
Developmental Perspective, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 241 (1996) (arguing that "midadolescents
typically might not yet have achieved adultlike ways of framing problems ... and generating
alternative responses to stressful situations or weighing the potential consequences of their
alternatives."); Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL 139, 161 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("[A]dolescents ...
may differ from adults in the weights that they give to potential positive and negative outcomes ...
[and] are more likely than adults to give greater weight to anticipated gains than to possible losses or
negative risks.").
40 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less education, and
less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while
at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is
an adult."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence Lessons from Developmental
Pyschology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 291, 304-05 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Scott, Lessons] ("Adolescents, perhaps because they have less knowledge and
experience, are less aware of risks than are adults . . . "[T]he fact that adolescents have less
experience and knowledge than adults seems likely to affect their decision making in tangible and
intangible ways." (citation omitted)).
41 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 36, at 153 ("In situations where adults will likely
perceive and weigh multiple alternatives as part of rational decision-making, adolescents typically see
only one option. This inflexible 'either-or-mentality' becomes especially acute under stressful
conditions.").
42 See Scott, supra note 32, at 1608, 1645-47 (discussing how youths' perceptions of and
preferences for risk differ from those of adults). Young people may discount negative future
consequences because they have more difficulty than adults integrating it because of their more
limited experience. See William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A
Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 17-19 (William Gardner
et al. eds., 1990); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 36, at 154 ("Adolescents, more than adults, tend to
discount the future and to afford greater weight to short-term consequences of decisions.").
43 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 815 ("[A]dolescents are less risk-
averse than adults, generally weighing rewards more heavily than risks in making choices. In part,
this may be due to limits on youthful time perspective; taking risks is more costly for those who focus
on the future."); Scott & Grisso, supra note 30, at 163 (arguing that adolescents are more willing to
take physical and social risks for the sake of experiencing novel and complex sensations).
4 See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity
as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCHOL.
1764 (2008).
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2. Neuroscience and Brain Development
The differences that social scientists observe between youths' and adults'
thinking and behavior correspond with human brain development.45  Two
neurobiological systems-the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the limbic system-
influence youths' ability to exercise judgment and to control impulses. 46 The PFC
controls executive functions such as reasoning, planning, and impulse control.4 7
45 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, summarizing research on brain
development and its implications for adolescent self-control:
[R]egions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning, regulation of
emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and reward continue to mature over
the course of adolescence, and perhaps well into young adulthood. At puberty, changes
in the limbic system-a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of
emotion-may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to take more
risks; these changes also may contribute to increased emotionality and vulnerability to
stress. At the same time, patterns of development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active
during the performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decision making,
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature well into middle
adolescence.
Id. at 816; see also Dahl, supra note 34, at 69 ("Regions in the PFC [prefrontal cortex] that
underpin higher cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing functional changes that
continue well into late adolescence/adulthood."). See generally NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
THE TEEN BRAIN STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION, available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/teenage-brain-a-work-in-progress.shtml (last visited
Jan. 28, 2008); Tomd§ Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and
Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence
for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859
(1999) [hereinafter Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence]; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued
Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships
During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001) [hereinafter Sowell et al.,
Mapping Continued Brain Growth] (discussing significant changes in brain structure prior to
adulthood); Spear, supra note 33, at 438 ("[T]he adolescent brain is a brain in flux, undergoing
numerous regressive and progressive changes in mesocorticolimbic regions.").
46 See Dahl, supra note 34, at 60 (arguing that affect regulation relates to the control of
feelings and behavior and "involves some inhibition, delay, or intentional change of emotional
expression or behavior to conform with learned social rules, to meet long-term goals, or to avoid
future negative consequences"); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 330 (2006) ("An adolescent's level of
cortical development may therefore be directly related to her or his ability to perform well in
situations requiring executive cognitive skills. Younger, less cortically mature adolescents may be
more at risk for engaging in impulsive behavior than their older peers . . . "); Laurence Steinberg, A
Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217
(2010); Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 91-92 (2008).
47 The prefrontal cortex [PFC] operates as the CEO of the brain and controls planning, goal-
directed responses, risk assessment, and impulse control. See, e.g., B.J. Casey et al., Structural and
Functional Brain Development and Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.
241, 244 (2000) (associating PFC with a variety of cognitive abilities and behavior control); B.J.
Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 62, 68 (2008) (reporting that brain's
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During late-adolescence, increased myelination 48 and synaptic pruning49 improve
reasoning ability and impulse control.50 By contrast, the limbic system controls
instinctual behavior, such as the fight-or-flight response." During adolescence, the
ability to control behavior continues to mature through late adolescence); Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd,
supra note 46, at 323 ("The frontal cortex has been shown to play a major role in the performance of
executive functions including short term or working memory, motor set and planning, attention,
inhibitory control and decision making."); R.K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd, Brain Development in
Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 30 NEUROSCI. &
BIOBEHAV. REVS. 718, 723 (2006) (reporting that adolescents are less able to self-regulate or control
behavior); Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Emotional and Cognitive Changes During Adolescence, 17
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 251, 253 (2007); Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain
Growth, supra note 45, at 8819 (describing brain growth in post-adolescents "in the superior frontal
regions that control executive cognitive functioning"); Frontline: Inside the Teenage Brain-
Interview with Jay Giedd (PBS television broadcast Mar. 31, 2002), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html ("The frontal lobe is
often. called the CEO, or the executive of the brain. It's involved in things like planning and
strategizing and organizing, initiating attention and stopping and starting and shifting attention.").
48 Myelin is a white, fatty substance that forms a sheath that surrounds and insulates the
neural axons and facilitates more rapid and efficient neurotransmission. Myelination and brain
growth in the frontal cortex during adolescence improve brain function by acting like the insulation
of a wire to increase the speed of neural electro-conductivity. Zoltan Nagy, Helena Westerberg &
Torkel Klingberg, Maturation of White Matter is Associated with the Development of Cognitive
Functions During Childhood, 16:7 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1227, 1231 (2004); ELKHONON
GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 144 (2001) (explaining
that "[t]he presence of myelin makes communication between different parts of the brain Taster and
more reliable.").
49 The gray matter or brain cell neurons that cover the top layer of the brain begin to thin
through a process of synaptic pruning which eliminates unused neuronal connections. The pruning
and elimination of unused connections promotes greater efficiency and strengthens the brain's ability
to process complex information. B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and
Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 241 (2000) (reporting that
"increasing cognitive capacity during childhood may coincide with a gradual loss [of grey matter]
rather than formation of new synapses"); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical
Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8175
(2004).
5o See Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 46, at 325 ("The significant correlations between
white matter volume and processing speed are consistent with evidence suggesting that increased
myelination of axons produces faster conduction velocity of neural signals and more efficient
processing of information, and further suggest that some of the increased cognitive abilities
characteristic of adult maturation may be associated with developmental increases in relative white
matter volume."); Paus et al., supra note 45, at 1908 ("The smooth flow of neural impulses
throughout the brain allows for information to be integrated across the many spatially segregated
brain regions involved in these functions. The speed of neural transmission depends not only on the
synapse, but also on structural properties of the connecting fibers, including the axon diameter and
the thickness of the insulating myelin sheath."); Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth,
supra note 45, at 8828 ("[I]t is likely that the visuospatial functions typically associated with parietal
lobes are operating at a more mature level earlier than the executive functions typically associated
with frontal brain regions.").
5' See, e.g., Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect
Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195,
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two systems are out of balance and teenagers rely more heavily on the limbic
system and less heavily on the PFC than do adults. 52 Youths' heightened quest for
pleasure and emotional rewards develops more rapidly than does the system for
self-control and self-regulation.53 Although neuroscientists have not established
direct links between brain development and real-life behavior nor found a way to
individualize among young offenders on the basis of brain development, their
research helps to explain adolescents' impulsive behavior.54
3. Peer Group Influences
Roper ascribed juveniles' diminished responsibility to their greater
susceptibility to negative peer influences.55 Juveniles commit crimes in groups to
a greater extent than do adults. 6 The presence of peers stimulates greater neural
195 (1999) (reporting that the amygdala is "a neural system that evolved to detect danger and
produce rapid protective responses without conscious participation.").
52 See id. at 199 (showing that processing of emotions shifted from the amygdala to the
frontal lobe over the course of the teenage years); Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Adolescent Development
of the Neural Circuitry for Thinking About Intentions, 2:2 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSC.
130 (2007); Stephanie Burnett et al., Development During Adolescence of the Neural Processing of
Social Emotion, 21:9 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1736 (2009); Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral
Scientist Looks at the Science ofAdolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 161-62
(2010).
s3 See David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children's Mental Health and the Juvenile
Justice System: Principle for Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 15 (2003)
("Adolescents tend to process emotionally charged decisions in the limbic system, the part of the
brain charged with instinctive (and often impulsive) reactions. Most adults use more of their frontal
cortex, the part of the brain responsible for reasoned and thoughtful responses. This is one reason
why adolescents tend to be more intensely emotional, impulsive, and willing to take risks than their
adult counterparts."); Dahl, supra note 34, at 64 ("These affective influences are relevant ... to many
day-to-day 'decisions' that are made at the level of gut feelings about what to do in a particular
situation (rather than any conscious computation of probabilities and risk value). These gut feelings
appear to be the products of affective systems in the brain that are performing computations that are
largely outside conscious awareness (except for the feelings they evoke).").
54 Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 765, 769 (2011) (arguing that "the data support conclusions only at the aggregate level, [but]
they shed little light on the developmental status of any given young person, except insofar as she is a
member of the group. While links between structural attributes, brain-level functional data, and
externalized behaviors are strengthening, they remain largely speculative."); Aronson, supra note 34,
at 136 (emphasizing "lack of clear causal pathway from brain structure to behavior"); Stephen J.
Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CIuM. L. 397, 405-06 (2006) (arguing that the simple fact of neuron-anatomical differences between
adolescent and adult brains does not compel differences in how the law responds to them).
55 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (noting adolescent susceptibility to
negative peer influences).
56 Police arrest two or more juveniles for committing a single crime more often than they do
adults. See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CENTER FOR Juv. JUST.,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 77 (1999) (showing percentages of
various crimes committed in groups by juveniles between 1973 and 1997); Scott & Grisso, supra
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activity in the reward centers of the brain which may increase risk-taking. 57
Youths engage in riskier behavior when together than they would when alone
which increases exposure to accessorial liability for crimes they did not intend or
personally commit.5 Youths' reduced ability to resist peer pressures diminishes
criminal responsibility compared with adults.5 9 All the defendants in Roper,
Graham, Miller, and Jackson committed their crimes with one or more co-
offenders.
note 30, at 162 ("Peer influence seems to operate through two means: social comparison and
conformity. Through social comparison, adolescents measure their own behavior by comparing it to
others. Social conformity . .. influences adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to that of
their peers."); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 36, at 153-54 ("The choice to engage in antisocial
conduct is often linked to the adolescent's desire for peer approval. Prodding by peers can substitute
for, and even overwhelm, an adolescent's own 'better' judgment about whether to engage in certain
conduct."); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 813 ("[T]eens are more responsive to
peer influence than are adults. Susceptibility to peer influence increases between childhood and early
adolescence as adolescents begin to individuate from parental control. This susceptibility peaks
around age fourteen and declines slowly during the high-school years.").
5 See, e.g., Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity
in the Brain's Reward Circuitry, 14:2 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F I, F8 (noting that with adolescents,
"awareness of peers selectively amplifies activity in the adolescent brain's incentive processing
system, which in turn influences subsequent decisions about risk.").
58 Group offending increases youths' prospects for prosecution as accessories and exposes
them to the same criminal penalties as principals. See, e.g., ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE,
supra note 30, at 152 ("Accessorial liability can interact with the vulnerability of adolescents to group
pressure to create very marginal conditions for extensive criminal sanctions."); Margo Gardner &
Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in
Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 626 (2005);
Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 815 ("[A] synergy likely exists between
adolescent peer orientation and risk-taking; considerable evidence indicates that people generally
make riskier decisions in groups than they do alone."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 22
(2008) (arguing that fear of social rejection may lead to spur-of-the-moment decisions to engage in
group crime).
5 See, e.g., Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 58, at 626; Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C.
Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531
(2007) (reporting that "[T]here is little doubt that peers actually influence each other and that the
effects of peer influence are stronger during adolescence than in adulthood."); Franklin E. Zimring,
Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity Capacity, and Diminished
Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271, 282 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Zimring, Penal Proportionality] ("But if social experience in matters such as anger and
impulse-management also counts, and a fair opportunity to learn to deal with peer pressures is
regarded as important, expecting the experienced-based ability to resist impulses and peers to be fully
formed prior to age eighteen or nineteen would seem on present evidence to be wishful thinking.");
Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 477, 488-90
(1998) (noting that "The ability to resist peer pressure is yet another social skill that is a necessary
part of legal obedience and is not fully development in many adolescents.").
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III. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA: REFRAMING PROPORTIONALITY FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS
The language and history of the Eighth Amendment does not dictate different
tests for capital and non-capital sentences. But the Court has used different
proportionality analyses based on its view that "death is different." 60 Apart from
Roper, the Court had not applied proportionality principles to juveniles as a class,
prohibited lengthy sentences for them, or established a minimum age for LWOP
sentences.6' As a result, lengthy mandatory minimum or LWOP sentences imposed
on juveniles did not elicit close judicial scrutiny.62 Although the seriousness of a
crime-harm and culpability-should be proportional to the sentence imposed,63
appellate courts focused on the gravity of harm rather than the culpability of the
actor.64 But the reduced culpability that precludes the death penalty for juvenile
65
offenders is just as diminished for other sentences.
60 See generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 923-26 (2011) (analyzing Court's dual-track
proportionality analyses and distinction between capital and non-capital sentence review). See, e.g.,
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) ("Proportionality review is one of several respects
in which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the Constitution
nowhere else provides."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 113 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (The Court's death penalty cases have limited applicability "[b]ecause a
sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long"); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 49
(2010); Richard S. Frase, Graham's Good News-and Not, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 54, 54 (2010)
(noting "Court's previous two-track distinction between death and prison sentences."); Youngjae Lee,
The Purposes ofPunishment Test, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 58, 58 (2010) (noting that the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence "proceeded along two tracks-capital and noncapital, with the two tracks
applying different tests and leading to different outcomes.").
6! But cf Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (questioning the constitutionality
of imposing an LWOP sentence on any thirteen-year-old).
62 See generally Cepparulo, supra note 16, at 225 ("For juveniles no longer facing death, the
opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence is lost."); Logan, supra note 27, at 703-09 (reviewing
cases upholding LWOP sentences on juveniles).
63 Stinneford, supra note 60, at 916 ("From a retributive point of view, a punishment is
proportionate to the offense if it matches the offender's moral culpability or desert."); see also
Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005); supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding a
mandatory LWOP imposed on a thirteen-year-old and reasoning that test of proportionality "does not
embody an element or consideration of the defendant's age, only a balance between the crime and the
sentence imposed. Therefore, there is no cause to create a distinction between a juvenile and an adult
who are sentenced to life without parole for first degree aggravated murder."); State v. Stinnett, 497
S.E.2d 696, 701-02 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-
year-old convicted of murder and noting that "when a punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by
statute, the punishment cannot be classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense").
65 Professor Zimring argues:
Doctrines of diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when large injuries have
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Graham v. Florida considered whether Roper's diminished responsibility
rationale would apply to a nonhomicide juvenile offender sentenced to life without
parole.66 Graham arose at the intersection of two lines of Eighth Amendment
proportionality cases. One line of cases raised "gross disproportionality" claims
and challenged term-of-year sentences that greatly exceeded the seriousness of the
crime. The other line of cases made "categorical disproportionality" claims and
challenged imposition of the death penalty on categories of offenders or offenses-
e.g., those with mental retardation, juveniles, and nonhomicide offenses.67
Challenges to length-of-years sentences required the Court to consider
whether the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle that applies to
non-capital sentences. Solem v. Helm held that a sentence of life without
possibility of parole for a property crime violated the Constitution.69 Solem's
proportionality analyses focused on three factors: "(i) the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions."7 0  By contrast, Harmelin v. Michigan upheld a life
without parole sentence imposed on a first-time drug dealer.71 After Harmelin,
been caused by actors not fully capable of understanding and self-control. The visible
importance of diminished responsibility in these cases arises because the punishments
provided for the fully culpable are quite severe, and the reductive impact of mitigating
punishment is correspondingly large. But if the doctrine of diminished responsibility
means anything in relation to the punishment of immature offenders, its impact cannot be
limited to trivial cases. Diminished responsibility is either generally applicable or
generally unpersuasive as a mitigating principle.
ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 84.
66 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020-21 (2011).
67 Id. at 2021; see, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting execution for
raping a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (barring execution for felony murderer who
did not kill or intend to kill victim); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 548 (1977) (barring execution for
rape of an adult woman); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (barring execution for felony
murderer who did not kill or intend to kill).
68 See generally, Frase, Proportionality, supra note 26, at 581-83 (reviewing Supreme
Court's criminal sentencing proportionality decisions); See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (elaborating upon
principles of "narrow proportionality" review in non-capital cases); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
284-85 (1980) (approving life with the possibility of parole sentence for a recidivist following his
third conviction for minor property crimes).
69 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 303 (1983). The Court noted that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments "prohibits . . . sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed," and that the "constitutional principle of proportionality has
been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century." Id. at 284, 286.
70 Id. at 292. Despite the elements of recidivism, the distinguishing factor in Solem was the
imposition of an LWOP sentence for a minor property crime. See id at 297.
71 The fractured Court could not agree on a constitutional rationale. Compare Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (announcing opinion of the Court and arguing that
proportionality principle only limited application of death penalty, but did not constitute a general
feature of Eighth Amendment analysis), with id. at 997, 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (upholding
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courts only review length-of-years sentences that cross some ill-defined "grossly
disproportionate" threshold.7 2
Categorical challenges to the death penalty involved entire classes of offenses
or offenders. Some decisions barred execution for nonhomicide crimes and some
felony murderers.74 Others prohibited states from executing less culpable
offenders-juveniles and the mentally disabled."
Graham posed "a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence." 76  It
required the Court to decide the validity of a sentence-life without parole-
applied to "an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes,"7
rather than to decide whether it was grossly disproportionate as applied to the
individual. Graham repudiated the Court's historical "death is different"
distinction, extended Roper's reduced culpability rationale, and "declare[d] an
sentence by finding it proportional under an Eighth Amendment analysis). A majority of the Court
could not agree with either opinion's legal reasoning. However, Justice Kennedy's Harmelin
concurrence provided the operative rule to assess disproportionate sentences. Id. at 1001 (arguing
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to
the crime"); Frase, Proportionality, supra note 26, at 581-83 (analyzing Harmelin and the factors
Justice Kennedy proposed).
72 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy J., concurring). According to Justice
Kennedy:
All of these principles-the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors-inform the final one: The Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather,
it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Id. at 1001; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19, 30-31 (2003) ("We hold that
Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the
three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments."); Barkow, supra note 60, at 49 (noting
that "Court applied an exceedingly deferential proportionality test" based on Kennedy's Harmelin
concurrence); Frase, Proportionality, supra note 26, at 581-83 (analyzing the factors Kennedy
proposed in Harmelin and the limited utility they provide defendants challenging a disproportionate
sentence).
73 Frase, supra note 60, at 54 (noting that "death is different" for categories of offenders-e.g.
juveniles-and categories of offenses-e.g. nonhomicide crimes).
74 See e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting execution for raping a
child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (barring execution for felony murderer who did not
kill or intend to kill victim); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (barring execution for rape of an
adult woman).
75 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring execution of youths who
committed their crimes while younger than eighteen years of age); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002) (barring execution of defendants with mental retardation).
76 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010); Leslie Patrice Wallace, "AndlDon't
Know Why It Is That You Threw Your Life Away": Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme
Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20
B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 35, 53-57 (2010) (analyzing the two lines of cases).
7 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
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entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence. .. "
Once the Court framed Graham as a categorical challenge to a sentencing
practice, 7 it replicated Roper's proportionality analyses and found a national
consensus against imposing an LWOP sentence on nonhomicide juvenile
offenders.80 Graham rested on three features-the offender, the offense, and the
81sentence. It reiterated Roper's rationale that juveniles' reduced culpability
warranted less severe penalties than those imposed on adults convicted of the same
crime.82 Graham explicitly based young offenders' diminished responsibility on
social science and neuroscience research. "[D]evelopments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to
mature through late adolescence."83
Graham invoked the Court's felony-murder death-penalty decisions and
concluded that even the most serious nonhomicide crimes "cannot be compared to
murder in their 'severity and irrevocability."' 84 Because the criminal responsibility
78 Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining that "[t]oday's decision eviscerates that
distinction. 'Death is different' no longer.").
7 The Court distinguished Harmelin because Graham raised a categorical rather than
individual proportionality challenge. Barkow, supra note 60, at 49 (noting that "the Court concluded
that Harmelin's threshold test that required a finding of gross disproportionality between the gravity
of the offense and the severity of the penalty 'does not advance the analysis."' Instead, the Court
summarily asserted that "'the appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that involved the
categorical approach."'); Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision of
Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 66, 67 (2010) (noting the
Court's application of capital punishment analysis to a term-of-years sentencing practice to exempt
an entire class of offenders).
so Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2023. Although thirty-seven states authorized LWOP sentences for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders, few states, other than Florida, actually imposed it.
[T]here are 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole sentences. A
significant majority of those, 77 in total, are serving sentences imposed in Florida. The
other 46 are imprisoned in just 10 States ... Thus, only I I jurisdiction nationwide in fact
impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders-and most of
those do so quite rarely-while 26 states . . . do not impose them despite apparent
statutory authorization.
Id. at 2024 (citations omitted).
81 Id. at 2026 (considering "the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question"). Graham involved a less
culpable offender, a less culpable offense, and an LWOP sentence. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two
Formerly Walled-OffApproaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT'G
REP. 79 (2010) (noting that the combination of three factors led to the result in Graham-juveniles,
conviction for a nonhomicide crime, and an LWOP sentence).
82 Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026(noting that "a juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his
actions, but his transgression 'is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."').
83 Id. at 2026; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (barring
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of juveniles who did not murder was doubly diminished, an LWOP sentence was
grossly disproportionate.85
Although execution differs from life imprisonment, the Court equated the
death penalty with LWOP sentences for juveniles as similarly ultimate sanctions-
"the sentence alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable."86 No
87 88 89 9penal rationale-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation90
justified the penultimate sanction for nonhomicide juvenile offenders. As a result
of "the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders and the severity of
life without parole sentences," Graham prohibited states from imposing a life
the death penalty for rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (barring the death
penalty for rape of an adult woman).
85 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (noting that "when compared to an adult murderer, a
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age
of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis.").
8 Id at 2027; id. at 2032 (noting that "[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives
no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.");
Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham-Justice Kennedy Stakes out a Path to Proportional
Punishment, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 67, 69 (2010) (noting the inconsistency between rehabilitation and
LWOP sentences that "'forswears altogether the idea that the defendant can change."'); Wallace,
supra note 76, at 58 (arguing that the rationale of Graham should also preclude lengthy term of year
sentences that deny juveniles hope of release as well as LWOP).
87 An LWOP for juveniles violated retributive proportionality principles because a juvenile
would serve more years and a larger percentage of life in prison than would an older offender.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (arguing that "A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life
without parole receive the same punishment in name only.").
88 Id. at 2029 (concluding that the marginal deterrent effect of an LWOP sentence on a
juvenile cannot justify the sentence).
8 Id. (acknowledging that incapacitation might reduce future risk of offending, but arguing
that a judge cannot predict at the time of sentencing that a "juvenile offender forever will be a danger
to society" or will remain irredeemably incorrigible).
90 An LWOP sentence deprives a young offender of incentive or opportunity to grow and
change. Id. "A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life's
end has little incentive to become a responsible individual ... A categorical rule against life without
parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of
maturity that led to an offender's crime is reinforced by the prison term." Id. at 2032-33.
LWOP denies the offender hope or the prospect of redemption. Id. at 2027. This sentence
"constitutes a 'denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are
immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days."'). See Alice Ristroph, Hope,
Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT'G. REP. 75, 76 (2010) (arguing that "Hope, or its
denial, distinguishes LWOP from other prison sentences-not irrevocability, and not any necessary
difference in the actual length of incarceration.").
LWOP also denies youth access to vocational training programs or rehabilitative services
afforded to those who may return to the community. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. See also ASHLEY
NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 4 (2012) (reporting that most juvenile lifers do not participate in vocational training or
rehabilitative programs because of state or prison policies).
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without parole sentence on youths who did not commit murder.9 '
Graham ruled categorically and denied trial courts the option to impose
LWOP sentences on a case-by-case basis. Graham reiterated clinicians' inability
to distinguish between most juveniles who have the capacity to change and the few
who might be incorrigible. Moreover, the same immaturity that diminished
youths' responsibility increased the risk of error in assessing their culpability. 92
Developmental immaturity impairs youths' ability to understand legal proceedings,
to communicate with counsel, and to make legal decisions. 93
As in Roper, the principal difference among the Graham Justices focused on
whether to apply a categorical rule and bar LWOP for all nonhomicide juveniles or
to impose the sentence on a case-by-case basis. Chief Justice Roberts agreed that
Graham's sentence was disproportionate, but argued that sentences should be
individualized, rather than applied categorically. 9 4 Chief Justice Roberts included
the "culpability of the offender" 95 in his proportionality analyses, a departure from
91 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
92 The Court noted that:
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant
disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited
understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors
within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in
their defense . . . Difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a
rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions . . . [and] impair the quality of a
juvenile defendant's representation.
Id at 2032; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "WHEN I DIE . . . THEY'LL SEND ME HOME": YOUTH
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN UPDATE 5 (2012) (reporting that
"Youth are often poorly represented and do not always adequately understand legal proceedings.");
Birckhead, supra note 79, at 69 (arguing that juveniles' mistrust of authority figures, limited
understanding of the justice system, and inability to work effectively with counsel put them at a
distinct disadvantage in criminal proceedings).
9 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful
Offenders, in YouTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 73 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds. 2000); Frase, supra note 60, at 56 (noting that juvenile defendants
pose greater risks of unwise litigation choices, poorer communication with counsel, and an increased
risk of ineffective defense representation and likelihood that they will receive an unconstitutionally
harsher sentence); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 343 (2003);
Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 459,
475 (2009).
94 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036-37 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 2042 (arguing
that "Some crimes are so heinous, and some juvenile offenders are so highly culpable, that a sentence
of life without parole may be entirely justified under the Constitution.").
9s Id. at 2039. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Harris v. Wright, rejected a fifteen-year-old
juvenile's proportionality challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence: "Youth has no obvious bearing
on this problem: If we can discern no clear line for adults, neither can we for youths. Accordingly,
while capital punishment is unique and must be treated specially, mandatory life without parole is, for
young and old alike, only an outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences." 93 F.3d 581, 585
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previous non-capital proportionality decisions that defined crime seriousness
primarily on the basis of the harm caused.9 6 Although he characterized Graham's
LWOP sentence as grossly disproportionate, he did not identify what factors
distinguish it from other youths' nonhomicide crimes in which an LWOP might be
imposed.98
Justice Thomas' dissent criticized the Graham majority for repudiating the
Court's "death is different" jurisprudence9 9 and for adopting a categorical
prohibition of a non-capital sentence. 100 He rejected the conclusion that all youths
always lack the culpability to warrant an LWOP sentence and argued that trial
courts could individualize and balance the seriousness of a crime with a youth's
diminished responsibility.'o' He noted the anomaly of barring juvenile LWOPs for
nonhomicide crimes, but leaving "intact state and federal laws that permit life-
(9th Cir. 1996). Although Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the Court's prior proportionality
analyses included consideration of the "offender's mental state and motive in committing the crime,
the actual harm caused to his victim or to society by his conduct, and any prior criminal history,"
these factors do not necessarily address the culpability of the actor. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2037
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). Rather, they deal with mens rea, harm, or risk. Mens rea-the intent or
mental state necessary to establish criminal liability-requires only knowledge of "right from wrong"
and defendants may assert the lack of such knowledge with an infancy or insanity defense. All of the
youths in Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson possessed the mens rea-i.e., knowledge of
wrongfulness-necessary to find them guilty of a crime. Significantly, these cases added
consideration of culpability-i.e. normative judgment about blameworthiness-for youths who
otherwise meet the minimum threshold of mens rea for criminal liability. See infra notes 140-155
and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
9 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, J., concurring) (noting that "Florida is an outlier in its
willingness to impose sentences of life without parole on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
crimes.").
98 See, e.g., Frase, supra note 60, at 54 (noting that "Justice Roberts's concurrence continued
to apply a standard of 'gross disproportionality' without saying what that means-disproportionate
relative to what?").
9 Justice Thomas objected that:
Until today, the Court has based its categorical proportionality rulings on the notion that
the Constitution gives special protection to capital defendants because the death penalty
is a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only those who are "most
deserving of execution." . . . Today's decision eviscerates that distinction. "Death is
different" no longer. The Court now claims not only the power categorically to reserve
the "most severe punishment" for those the Court thinks are "'the most deserving of
execution,"' but also to declare that "less culpable" persons are categorically exempt
from the "second most severe penalty."
'" Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046-47 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas complained that
the majority's reinvigorated non-capital proportionality analyses "impose[s] a categorical
proportionality rule banning life-without-parole sentences not just in this case, but in every case
involving a juvenile nonhomicide offender, no matter what the circumstances."
1o1 Id. at 2055 (arguing that "The integrity of our criminal justice system depends on the ability
of citizens to stand between the defendant and an outraged public and dispassionately determine his
guilt and the proper amount of punishment based on the evidence presented.").
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without-parole sentences for juveniles who commit homicides."'102  He
characterized this as disproportionality based on categories of crimes rather than
characteristics of offenders,10 3 an inconsistency the Court would later address in
Miller and Jackson.
IV. MILLER V. ALABAMA AND JACKSON V. HOBBS: "CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT"
Forty-two states permit judges to impose LWOP sentences on adults or
juveniles convicted of murder.104 In twenty-nine states, the LWOP sentence is
mandatory. 0 5  Mandatory sentences preclude individualized culpability
evaluations and equate the criminal responsibility of juveniles with adults. 06
Courts rarely invalidate juvenile LWOP sentences 07 and most reject juveniles'
102 id
103 Id. at 2055-56 (objecting that "the Court's conclusion that life-without parole sentences are
'grossly disproportionate' for juvenile nonhomicide offenders in fact has very little to do with its
view of juveniles, and much more to do with its perception that 'defendants who do not kill, intend to
kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of
punishment than are murderers."); see also Wallace, supra note 76, at 59 (arguing that "the very
essence of Graham's reasoning should also preclude life without parole even for juvenile murderers .
. . [B]y stating that juveniles are less culpable than adults[, t]he Court's reasoning does not
distinguish between the non-homicide [sic] and homicide juvenile offender. . . ").
' AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 25 n.44 (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestoffheirLives.pdf (listing states' LWOP
sentencing provisions).
105 Id.
106 Defining a crime's seriousness primarily on the basis of the harm caused and the
defendant's mens rea-knowledge of wrongfulness to cause that harm-precludes any individualized
consideration of culpability or diminished responsibility. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating proportionality analyses that include an evaluation of the
offender's culpability); Brink, supra note 30, at 1576 ("[E]ven if juveniles cause the same harm as
their adult counterparts, they are less culpable, because less responsible, because less normatively
competent."); Logan, supra note 27, at 703 ("By divorcing 'crime' from offender culpability in
proportionality analysis, these courts subscribe to an essentially circular inquiry: because murder, for
instance, is a very 'serious' crime in the eyes of the legislature, it can be met with a very 'serious'
statutory punishment.").
See, e.g., Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a fifteen-year-old
juvenile's constitutional challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed for murder); Rice v.
Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on an
illiterate, mildly retarded sixteen-year-old murderer, even though the statute excluded consideration
of any mitigating factors, including youthfulness and holding that "we cannot find any basis in
decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment, or in any other source of guidance to the meaning of
'cruel and unusual punishments,' for concluding that the sentence in this case was unconstitutionally
severe.").
107 See, e.g., Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (prohibiting life
sentence for fourteen-year-old convicted of rape because "[t]he intent of the legislature in providing a
penalty of life imprisonment without benefit of parole ... was to deal with dangerous and
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pleas to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor. 08 Although Roper treated
youthfulness as a categorical mitigating factor, many trial judges treat it as an
aggravating factor when they sentence juvenile murderers.' 09 Even if LWOP
incorrigible individuals who would be a constant threat to society. We believe that incorrigibility is
inconsistent with youth."); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (finding that LWOP
sentence imposed on thirteen-year-old convicted of murder violated state constitution provisions
against cruel and unusual punishment, but granting only limited right to be considered for parole
eligibility in the distant future); People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726-27 (Cal. 1983) (reducing life
sentence imposed on seventeen-year-old convicted of felony murder because he "was an unusually
immature youth"); People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (111. 2002) (rejecting as disproportionate an
LWOP sentencing imposed on a fifteen-year-old, passive accessory to a felony murder and holding
that "a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the
factual realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant's personal culpability such
that it shocks the moral sense of the community").
108 See, e.g., Tate v. State, 864 So.2d 44, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the argument
that "a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual punishment on a twelve-year-
old child . . . "); Edmonds v. State, 955 So.2d 864, 895-97 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (approving an
LWOP sentence imposed on a youth convicted of murder committed at thirteen years of age); State v.
Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (upholding a "two-strike" LWOP sentence imposed on a
fifteen-year-old convicted of burglary based on his prior juvenile conviction for a serious felony, a
sentence presumably invalid after Graham); State v. Foley, 456 So.2d 979, 984 (La. 1984)
(affirming LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old juvenile convicted of rape); State v. Pilcher,
655 So.2d 636, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old);
Swinford v. State, 653 So.2d 912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding LWOP sentence imposed on
fourteen-year-old convicted of aiding and abetting murder); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832
(N.C. 1998) (upholding life imprisonment sentence for thirteen-year-old convicted of rape,
recognizing that "the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in
determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime," but emphasizing that
Green was morally responsible for the crime because he possessed sufficient mental capacity to form
criminal intent); Paul G. Morrissey, Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel
and Unusual Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in State v.
Green, 44 VILL. L. REv. 707, 738 (1999); AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104,
at I (noting that when courts sentence children as adults, the punishment is all too often no different
from that given to adults).
109 See Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 227, 236-37 (Jeffrey Fagan
& Franklin E. Zimring eds. 2000) (comparing the sentences imposed on youths transferred to criminal
courts with those of adults and noting that "transferred youths are sentenced more harshly, both in
terms of the probability of receiving a prison sentence and the length of the sentences they receive.
In other words, we see no evidence that criminal courts recognize a need to mitigate sentences based
on considerations of age and immaturity."); Megan C. Kurlychek & Briand D. Johnson, Juvenility
and Punishment: Sentencing Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 725 (2010)
(reporting that judges sentenced waived juveniles more harshly than similar young adult offenders in
four states); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused":
The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 665 (2003)
(citing the impact of "get tough" politics and arguing that "[b]y the mid-1990's [sic], youth had
ceased to be a mitigating factor in adult court, and instead had become a liability.").
Youths convicted of murder are more likely to enter prison with LWOP sentences than are
adults convicted of murder. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104, at 33
(reporting that judges imposed LWOP sentences on juveniles convicted of murder more frequently
than they did adults and concluding that "states have often been more punitive towards children who
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sentences are not mandatory, judges can impose consecutive terms that create
functional LWOP sentences. 110
In 2009, more than 2,500 people were serving LWOP sentences for crimes
they committed as children."' The number of juveniles serving life sentences and
lengthy consecutive terms is much larger.112 Most juveniles who received an
LWOP sentence had no prior adult or juvenile convictions.11 3 Although states may
not execute a felony murderer who did not kill or intend to kill,1 4 more than one-
quarter of LWOP sentences imposed on juveniles were for a felony murder, such
as the defendant in Jackson."5
The Court in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs extended Roper and
Graham to their logical conclusion and banned mandatory LWOP sentences for
youths convicted of murder.116 Justice Kagan responded to the claim in Justice
commit murder than adults," and that "age has not been much of a mitigating factor in the sentencing
of youth convicted of murder"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 92, at 4 (reporting that "in more
than half the cases where there was an adult co-defendant, the adult received a lower sentence than
the young person who was sentenced to life without parole.").
110 After the court ofappeals overturned an invalid LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-
old juvenile, the trial judge in People v. Demirdjian simply resentenced him to two consecutive life
sentences. 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 184, 188-89 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that while California law prohibits
sentencing juveniles under sixteen years of age to life without parole, the court dismissed the
juvenile's reliance on Roper v. Simmons and emphasized the clear difference between death and
lesser sentences); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding a 100-year
sentence imposed on a thirteen-year-old juvenile for burglary, rape, and robbery.).
1" See, e.g., KENNETH ROTH ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 538 (2009)
(estimating 2,502 youths serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed while younger than eighteen
years of age), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79365); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
92, at 2 (reporting that "The number of youth sentenced to life without parole in the US has risen to
2,570"); ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, No EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA 17-25 (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc noexitseptember2009.pdf
(summarizing number, location, and ethnic composition of offenders serving life sentences for crimes
committed as juveniles).
112 See id. at 3, 17 (reporting that 6,807 juveniles serving life with the possibility of parole
sentences).
113 Id. at 31. More than half (59%) ofjuveniles received an LWOP sentence for their first-ever
conviction. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104, at 1.
114 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional
when imposed on felony-murder defendant who did not kill or intend to kill).
115 AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104, at 27-28; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 92, at 4 (reporting that nearly half of youths sentenced to LWOP did not actually
commit the murder). In Michigan, courts convicted nearly half the juveniles serving LWOP
sentences as accessories rather than as principals. DEBORAH LABELLE, SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES
SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 4 (2004), available at
www.aclumich.org/pubs/juvenilelifers.pdf.
116 Miller/Jackson reaffirmed Roper and Graham's constitutional premise that immaturity,
susceptibility to peer influences, and transitional personality development reduced youths' culpability
and warranted less severe punishment than adults:
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Thomas' Graham dissent that Graham rested on categories of crimes rather than
characteristics of offenders, emphasizing that "none of what it said about
children-about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental
vulnerabilities-is crime specific."' 17
Miller/Jackson invoked another line of death penalty cases that barred
mandatory capital sentences and required individualized culpability assessments." 8
Mandatory death sentences precluded consideration of the crime, the offender, and
relevant mitigating circumstances." 9 Miller/Jackson invoked those precedents to
require individualized culpability assessments prior to imposing an LWOP
sentence. 120 Mandatory LWOP sentences prevent the sentencing judge from
Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we
explained, "they are less deserving of the most severe punishments." . . . First, children
have a "lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility," leading to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk taking. Second, children "are more
vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures," including from their family
and peers; they have "limited contro[l] over their own environment" and lack the ability
to extricate themselves from horrific, crime producing settings. And third, a child's
character is not as "well formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions
less likely to be "evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity]."
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citations omitted); see also, supra notes 30-
53 and accompanying text (reviewing developmental psychological research bearing on adolescents'
criminal responsibility).
'7 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Roper barred the death penalty for all children, and Graham
equated a nonhomicide juvenile's LWOP sentence with the death penalty. Id. at 2466 (noting that
Graham "viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the death penalty, [and] we treated it
similarly to that most severe punishment.").
118 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (holding that "in capital
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense"). Woodson condemned "[A] process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense [which]
excludes . . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass . . . " Id.
119 See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74 (1987) (requiring the sentencing authority to
consider mitigating circumstances relative to the offense and the defendant as an individual); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (requiring "reasoned moral response" that reflects offender's
individual culpability).
120 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (postulating that "[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment," and precludes "sentencing practices based on mismatches between the
culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty.") Justice Kagan emphasized that
"children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing" and invoked the
Court's death penalty jurisprudence to require "individualized sentencing for defendants facing the
most serious penalties." Id. at 2464, 2460. She noted that "In those cases, we have prohibited
mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the
characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death." Id. at
2463; see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
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considering youthfulness or other mitigating factors and thereby disproportionally
equate juveniles' and adults' culpability.12 1  Miller/Jackson asserted that once
judges conducted an individualized culpability assessment and properly considered
youths' generic diminished responsibility, there would be very few occasions in
which to impose an LWOP sentence.122
Justice Thomas' dissent argued that Harmelin v. Michigan had upheld a
mandatory LWOP sentence for an adult without requiring individualized
sentencing. 123 Justice Kagan responded that a sentencing scheme that was valid
for adults could still violate the constitution when applied to children. "We have
by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults
may not be so for children . . . So if (as Harmelin recognized) 'death is different,'
children are different too."1 24  Chief Justice Roberts argued that no national
consensus against mandatory LWOP sentences existed because the majority of
states approved the practice for adults and juveniles convicted of murder. 125
Justice Kagan asserted that Miller/Jackson did not absolutely preclude an LWOP
sentence for a juvenile murderer, but only required its individualized application
after taking into account the youthfulness of the offender. 126  Individualized
121 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. "Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentence
from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances
attendant to it."; see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (requiring sentencer to consider
"the mitigating qualities of youth."). Miller/Jackson emphasized that
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological
age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home
environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot extricate himself-no matter
how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense,
including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth-for
example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys ... And finally, this mandatory
punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most
suggest it.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. The Court noted that the fifteen jurisdictions in which judges have
discretion to impose LWOP sentences on juveniles only accounted for 15% of youths, whereas the 29
jurisdictions in which LWOP is mandatory accounted for 85% of all youths sentenced. Id. at 2471-
72 n.10.
122 Id. at 2469 (noting that "we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon."); see also, id. at 2471-72 n. 10 (observing that "when
given the choice, sentencers impose life without parole on children relatively rarely.").
123 Id. at 2485-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2470 (majority opinion); see also id at 2465 (noting that Roper and Graham
invalidated punishments for children that could be imposed on adults).
125 Id. at 2479 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 2471 (majority opinion) (noting that "[olur decision does not categorically bar a
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime . . . [but] mandates only that a sentence follow a
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assessment avoided the danger that juvenile waiver statutes and criminal
sentencing provisions could produce more severe outcomes than the legislature
intended. 127
Justice Breyer filed a separate concurrence in Jackson because fourteen-year-
old Jackson was convicted of felony murder and received a mandatory LWOP
sentence as an accomplice rather than as the shooter. The Court's felony-murder
decisions limited the death penalty to those who killed or intended to kill.12 8
Because Graham recognized the "twice diminished" moral culpability of youths
"who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken," 129 Justice Breyer
reasoned that a juvenile who neither killed nor intended to kill is no more culpable
than a youth convicted of a nonhomicide felony. 130 As a result, at Jackson's
certain process-considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics before-imposing a
particular penalty.").
127 Id. at 2472 (noting that the interaction of independent statutes-transfer to adult court and
penalties for people convicted in criminal court-made it "impossible to say whether a legislature
had endorsed a given penalty for children (or would do so if presented with the choice.)"). Justice
Kagan observed:
[m]ost States do not have separate penalty provisions for those [waived] juvenile
offenders. Of the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole for children, more than
half do so by virtue of generally applicable penalty provisions, imposing the sentence
without regard to age. And indeed, some of those states set no minimum age for who
may be transferred to adult court in the first instance, thus applying life without parole
mandates to children of any age-be it 17 or 14 or 10 or 6.
Id. at 2473. Even in jurisdictions that conduct judicial waiver hearings, the issues of waiver-
amenability to treatment-and the age limits of juvenile court jurisdiction pose different questions
than the amount of punishment a youth convicted of murder deserved. Id. at 2474 (noting that "the
question at transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a post-trial sentencing," and
judges confront an extreme forced choice between lenient sanctions as a juvenile and standard
punishment as an adult).
The dissent questioned the majority's contention that a "legislature is so ignorant of its own
laws that it does not understand that two of them interact with each other.. . . [H]ere the widespread
and recent imposition of the sentence makes it implausible to characterize this sentencing practice as
a collateral consequence of legislative ignorance." Id. at 2479-80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
In many jurisdictions, transfer is automatic for youths charged with murder. See, e.g., Barry C.
Feld and Donna M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 801, 818-22 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012)
(describing waiver practices without individual assessments); PATRICK GRIFFIN, SEAN ADDIE,
BENJAMIN ADAMS & KATHY FIRESTINE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 5 (2011).
128 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (requiring consideration of felony
murderer's "intentions, expectations, and actions."); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1986); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
129 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
130 Id. (finding that children "who [did] not kill or intend to kill" have a "twice diminished"
culpability based on their age and the nature of their crime). Justice Breyer asserted that "[g]iven
Graham's reasoning, the kinds of homicide that can subject a juvenile offender to life without parole
must exclude instances where the juvenile himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim. . . .
[W]here the juvenile neither kills nor intends to kill, both features emphasized in Graham as
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resentencing hearing, the trial judge could not impose an LWOP sentence.
V. YOUTH DISCOUNT: AGE-AS-A-PROXY FOR REDUCED CULPABILITY
Graham gave the 123 youths serving LWOP sentences for nonhomicide
crimes very limited relief. It required states to provide them with "some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation,"' 3' but did not define states' responsibility to provide youths with
resources with which to change or identify when they would become eligible for
parole.132 Does a "meaningful opportunity" to change require states to provide
rehabilitative programs? 3 3  Would a first parole release hearing in forty years
provide "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release"? Graham enjoined the
states to develop "the means and mechanisms for compliance"' 34 and emphasized
that parole review would not guarantee eventual release.135
Miller/Jackson requires individualized culpability assessments and recognizes
extenuating apply." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475-76 (Breyer, J., concurring).
' Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; see also Nilsen, supra note 86, at 69 (arguing that "[t]he state
is required to give juveniles a chance to reform themselves and must revisit the life sentence in
something akin to a parole hearing.").
132 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (identifying several issues
raised, but unresolved by the majority opinion. "[W]hat, exactly, does ... a 'meaningful' opportunity
[to obtain release] entail? When must it occur? And what Eighth Amendment principles will govern
review by the parole boards the Court now demands that States empanel? The Court provides no
answers to these questions. . ."); Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED.
SENT'G REP. 75, 76 (2010) (noting that Graham requires "only the opportunity to obtain release, not a
guarantee of eventual release. Much will depend on the nature of parole review as established by the
states, and on the decision makers in individual cases . . . "); Wallace, supra note 76, at 66
(summarizing questioning during oral argument in which Graham's counsel conceded that parole
eligibility after 40 years or grant of parole to I out of 20 applicants could be constitutional).
133 See, e.g., Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How
the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRtu. L. 1, 12 (2011)
(arguing that states "must employ a rehabilitative model for incarceration of juveniles" in separate
youth prisons to realistically comply with Graham's requirement of "meaningful opportunity" for
reform).
114 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. The Court adopted a similar strategy in Atkins to remit to
states the responsibility to assess whether and how defendants' mental retardation affected their
death-eligibility. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
135 Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). The Court asserted:
while the Eighth amendment forbids a State from imposing a life without parole sentence
on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender
during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn
out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.
The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of
nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does
forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit
to reenter society.
Id. at 2030.
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the mitigating role of youthfulness.136  However, neither decision provides
legislatures, judges, or parole boards with any practical guidance as to how to
incorporate the mitigating qualities of youth into sentencing or release decisions.
State courts are divided whether to apply Miller/Jackson retroactively to the
thousands of youths who previously received mandatory LWOP sentences for
murder.'3 7 State legislatures are scrambling to revise sentencing laws to convert
mandatory LWOP statutes to life with the possibility of parole,'3 8 to impose
minimum terms of years, 39 or to specify mitigating factors in sentencing
136 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (instructing judges "to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.").
137 To preserve finality of judgments, the Court, in Teague v. Lane, restricted the retroactive
applicability of constitutional rulings to "watershed rules of criminal procedure." 489 U.S. 288, 288
(1988). The Court gives retroactive effect only to rules that safeguard the accuracy of convictions
and "implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial." Id. at 312. In the context of death penalty
decisions, the Court, in Ring v. Arizona, applied the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), and held that when imposing a capital sentence, a jury rather than a judge must find the
existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). However, in
Schriro v. Summerlin, the Court characterized Ring as a procedural ruling and declined to give it
retroactive application. 542 U.S. 348 (2004). See generally Katharine A. Ferguson, The Clash of
Ring v. Arizona and Teague v. Lane: An Illustration of the Inapplicability of Modern Habeas
Retroactivity Jurisprudence in the Capital Sentencing Context, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1017 (2005).
State courts are divided whether to apply Miller/Jackson retroactively to offenders who
received mandatory LWOP sentences as juveniles. Compare, e.g., Geter v. State, No. 3D12 1736,
2012 WL 4448860, at *3 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 27, 2012) (holding that Miller was "not of fundamental
significance" but, instead, was "a procedural change in law" regarding criminal sentencing, and, thus,
could not be applied retroactively); People v. Carp, No. 307758, 2012 WL 5846553 (Mich. Ct. Ap.
2012) (following Teague and holding that Michigan law does not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review because the decision is procedural and does not comprise a watershed ruling), with
State v. Simmons, 99 So.3d 28 (La. 2012) (remanding mandatory LWOP juvenile for reconsideration
and resentencing based on Miller); State v. Lockheart, 820 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012)
(remanding for resentencing in accordance with Miller in which the sentencing court shall "have the
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for
juveniles."); People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 196-97 (Ill. App. 2012) (holding that "[U]nder the
proportionate punishment analysis in Miller, defendant was denied a 'basic "precept of justice"' by
not receiving any consideration of his age from the circuit court in sentencing," and finding that a
new rule applies retroactively "where it has made a substantial or substantive change in the law ...
Miller not only changed procedures, but also made a substantial change in the law in holding under
the Eighth Amendment that the government cannot constitutionally apply a mandatory sentence of
life without parole for homicides committed by juveniles."); People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010
(2012) (same).
138 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19A (West 2012) (providing that a juvenile
convicted of first degree felony murder shall be sentenced to "life imprisonment with parole" and
become eligible for parole release after a minimum of 25 years imprisonment) (emphasis added). A
juvenile convicted of murder may be sentenced to life without parole after consideration of mitigating
factors that include: Age at the time of the offense; Immaturity; Ability to appreciate the risks and
consequences of the conduct; Intellectual capacity; Prior record; Mental health; Familial or peer
pressure; Likelihood of rehabilitation; and any other mitigating factor. Id. at § 15A-1340.19B(c).
1 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 70(2)(B) (West 2013) (allowing juvenile sentenced to
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guidelines. 140  To circumvent a Miller/Jackson resentencing hearing, the Iowa
Governor commuted mandatory LWOP sentences of thirty-eight juveniles to
mandatory sixty-year prison terms instead.141
Rather than try to weigh the role of youthfulness on a discretionary basis,
states should formally incorporate an offender's age as a mitigating factor in
sentencing statutes.142  The Court's jurisprudence of youth recognizes that
juveniles who produce the same harms as adults are not their moral equals and do
not deserve the same consequences for their immature decisions.143  Roper,
Graham, and Miller/Jackson endorse youthfulness as a mitigating factor that
applies to capital and non-capital sentences.144
LWOP to file petition for resentencing after 15 years and instructing court to consider juvenile's
involvement in rehabilitation programs, showing of remorse, and the like); Id. at § 1170 (2)(J) (West
2013) (applying statute retroactively).
140 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (2013) (specifying generic mitigating factors for judge to
consider when sentencing juveniles convicted of capital crimes).
141 Douglas A. Berman, Reviewing Just Some of the Miller Meshugas in Some States, SENT. L.
& POL'Y (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-andpolicy/2012/11 /revewining-just-some-of-the-
miller-meshugas-in-some-states.html. The strategy was to avoid the individualized resentencing
hearing order in State v. Lockheart, 820 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (requiring resentencing
and consideration of mitigating circumstances).
142 As the Court repeatedly has recognized,
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete
with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally
are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly "during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment"
expected of adults.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115-16 (1982)).
143 See Scott, Lessons, supra note 40, at 309 ("[Adolescents' choices] reflect immaturity and
inexperience and are driven by developmental factors that will change in predictable and systemic
ways. A legal response that holds young offenders accountable, while recognizing that they are less
culpable than their adult counterparts, serves the purposes of criminal punishment without violating
the underlying principle of proportionality."); Zimring, Penal Proportionality, supra note 59, at 278
("[E]ven after a youth passes the minimum threshold of competence that leads to a finding of
capacity to commit crime, the barely competent youth is not as culpable and therefore not as
deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully qualified adult offender."); ZIMRING, AMERICAN
YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 144 ("[W]henever a young offender's need for protection,
education, and skill development can be accommodated without frustrating community security, there
is a government obligation to do so."); Scott & Grisso, supra note 30, at 182 ("Subjecting thirteen-
year-old offenders to the same criminal punishment that is imposed on adults offends the principles
that define the boundaries of criminal responsibility."); Victor Streib & Bernadette Schrempp, Life
Without Parole for Children, 21 CRIM. JUST. 4, 12 (Winter 2007) ("[Adolescents'] crimes may be the
same as those of adults, but these offenders simply are not adults and should not be sentenced as if
they were.").
144 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (noting that "[t]he principle behind
today's decisions seems to be only that because juveniles are different from adults, they must be
sentenced differently. There is no clear reason that principle would not bar all mandatory sentences
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Roper eschewed individualized culpability assessments and adopted a
categorical sentencing rule because "[t]he differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too well marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful
person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability." 45 The Court
feared that a judge or jury could not properly consider the mitigating quality of
youthfulness when confronted with a hideous crime.146 Roper and Graham based
their categorical holding on the inability of clinicians or jurors to distinguish
between most juveniles who are immature and a rare more culpable youth. 147 They
adopted a categorical rule despite their recognition that juveniles' culpability could
vary.148 The Court reasoned that notwithstanding individual variability, a rule that
occasionally "under-punishes the rare, fully-culpable adolescent still will produce
less aggregate injustice than a discretionary system that improperly, harshly
sentences many more undeserving youths."l49 Roper and Graham's categorical
for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive.").
145 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2004).
146 See id. at 573 ("An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature
of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course,
even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity
should require a sentence less severe than death."). Emens, supra note 21, at 87 ("Even if there are a
few juveniles who could be among the worst of society's offenders, jurors will make errors of
unacceptable frequency and magnitude. For this reason, we cannot trust ourselves to decide that a
child is culpable enough to be punished as an adult. . . ").
147 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ("It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.").
148. Id. at 574.
The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual
turns 18. By the same token, some undei 18 have already attained a level of maturity
some adults will never reach. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at
which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.
Id. Development is highly variable-a few youths may be mature prior to becoming eighteen
years of age, while many others may not attain maturity even as adults. See Brink, supra note 30, at
1570 (arguing that the development of normative competence is part of the maturation process from
childhood to adulthood). "Though not all individuals mature at the same rate, and some individuals
never mature, this sort of normative maturation is strongly correlated with age. The reduced
normative competence of juveniles provides a retributive justification for reduced punishment for
juveniles." Id.; see also ZlMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 148 ("The range of
individual variation among youths of the same age is notoriously large."); Fagan, supra note 9, at 209
("The age at which adolescents realize the developmental competencies that constitute culpability
will vary: a significant number of juveniles will be immature and lacking in the developmental
attributes of culpability well before age eighteen, and some may still lack these competencies after
age eighteen . . . ").
149 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ("If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and
observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having
antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far
graver condemnation-that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.").
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rule and Miller/Jackson's affirmation of the mitigating qualities of youthfulness
reflect the judgment that youths who cause the same harm still deserve less severe
punishment because of their reduced blameworthiness. 50
Chief Justice Roberts in Graham'5 and the dissents in Roper, Graham, and
Miller/Jackson advocated individualized culpability assessments rather than a
categorical rule. 5 2 Despite the Court's preference for individualized discretion, a
categorical rule of mitigation is preferable for two reasons.153 Culpability is not an
objective fact, but a normative conclusion about criminal responsibility. As a
result, judges cannot define or identify what constitutes the adult level culpability
among offending youths that deserves adult punishment.154 Clinicians lack tools
with which to assess impulsivity, foresight, and preference for risk, and any metric
with which to equate those qualities with criminal responsibility.'55 The inability
150 In contemporary criminal law theory, penal proportionality may reflect either the quality of
an actor's choice or what that choice indicates about the actor's moral character. The former focuses
on the blameworthiness of the choices made, while the latter focuses on what that choice indicates
about the actor's bad character. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 801-02; see
also R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 367-68 (1993);
Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 548, 574-92 (1997); Morse, supra note 54, at 405 ("The criteria for responsibility are
behavioral and normative, not empirically demonstrable states of the brain."); Stephen J. Morse,
Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1998); Scott & Steinberg,
Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 801 ("Because these developmental factors influence their criminal
choices, young wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional criminal law
conceptions of mitigation."); Fagan, supra note 9, at 242 ("[Adolescence, per se, is a mitigating status
because youths' developmental deficits] are not the deficits of an atypical adolescent but are 'normal'
developmental processes common to all adolescents.").
"5' 130 S. Ct. at 2042 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (cautioning that "[o]ur system depends upon
sentencing judges applying their reasoned judgment to each case that comes before them.").
152 Some commentators also endorsed individualized assessments. See, e.g., ZIMRING,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 149-52 (arguing that age is an incomplete proxy for
culpability and proposing individualized culpability assessments without specifying the factors
judges would consider); Cepparulo, supra note 16, at 253 (arguing against mandatory LWOPs for
juveniles and proposing that "[n]o juvenile should be given a punishment as solemn as LWOP
without an individual assessment of proportionality in relation to the crime committed."); Craig S.
Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?, 86 TuL. L. REv.
309 (2012) (criticizing Graham for failing to recognize that some nonhomicide offenders commit
horrific crimes that deserve LWOP sentences).
1s3 Brink, supra note 30, at 1578 (arguing that age provides an imperfect boundary marker for
immaturity and proposing to use age as a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to achieve
individualized justice).
154 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting); AMNESTY INT'L
& HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104, at 48 ("[While] the rate at which the adolescent brain
acquires adult capabilities differs from individual to individual ... researchers have identified broad
patterns of changes in adolescents that begin with puberty and continue into young adulthood.");
Morse, supra note 37, at 62 (observing that "there are no reliable and valid measures" of culpability
that accurately can distinguish adolescents from adults).
1ss Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2004); ZlMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE,
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to define and measure immaturity, or to equate it with culpability, would introduce
a systematic bias toward over-punishing the vast majority of less blameworthy
youths.156 The law uses age-based categories to approximate the maturity required
for other activities-e.g., voting, driving, and consuming alcohol-because it is
impossible or inefficient to try to make individualized judgments about maturity. 15
A categorical rule controls for the inability of judges or juries to fairly balance the
abstract idea of youthfulness against the aggravating reality of a horrific crime.158
supra note 30, at 148 ("[We lack] good data on the social skills and social experience of adolescent
offenders. The important elements of penal maturity have yet to be agreed upon, let alone assessed in
large numbers of cases."); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 836-37 ("[W]e
currently lack the diagnostic tools to evaluate psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized
basis or to distinguish young career criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as adults, will
repudiate their reckless experimentation. Litigating maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be an
error-prone undertaking, with the outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity."); Elizabeth
Cauffinan, Aligning Justice System Processing with Developmental Science, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 751, 754 (2012) (arguing that "[a]lthough tailoring sentencing and treatment to the specific
characteristics of each offender is a worthwhile goal, it is also a highly elusive one. Research has
shown that clinical judgment or forensic evaluation is fallible.. . [Tlhe degree of uncertainty when
applied to a specific individual remains large.").
156 See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 9, at 248 ("The difficulties and statistical error rates in
measuring immaturity for juveniles invite complexity in the consistent application of the law.").
Fagan contends:
Even when individualized assessments are conducted using modem scientific and clinical
tools, the risks of error due to measurement and diagnostic limitations suggest that it is
neither reliable nor efficient for each court to assess the competency of each juvenile
individually. The precise conditions of immaturity, incapacity, and incompetency are
difficult to consistently and fairly express in a capital sentencing context. Further,
cognitive and volitional immaturity might be easily concealed by demeanor or physical
appearance and, more importantly, obscured by the gruesome details of a murder and its
emotional impact on the victim's family.
Id. at 253; see also Robin M.A. Weeks, Note, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded:
How the Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J.
PUB. L. 451, 479 (2003) (noting that when the Court requires individualized culpability assessments it
raises difficult definitional questions: "What is the 'normal' adult level of culpability? How do we
measure it?").
157 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 581-86 (providing statutory appendices listing limits on
juveniles' rights to vote, marry, and serve on a jury as a result of immaturity); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 35-36 (1982); Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile
Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-
Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 89-91 (1999) (analyzing the inconsistency between
punishing adolescents like adults while denying their autonomy claims in areas outside of the
criminal law); Richard 0. Brooks, "The Refurbishing": Reflections Upon Law and Justice Among the
Stages of Life, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 619 (2006) (noting that the designation of diminished responsibility
for juveniles is an example of our legal system's provision of legal duties and immunities based upon
stages of life); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying An Ageless Conundrum, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1268 (2000) (arguing that presumption of decisional incapacity pervades most
areas of law and conflicts with a model of adolescent autonomy); Zimring, Penal Proportionality,
supra note 59, at 287; Scott, supra note 32, at 1608, 1611.
158 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 398 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is thus
unsurprising that individualized consideration at transfer and sentencing has not in fact ensured that
140 [Vol 11: 1
2013 THE YOUTH DISCOUNT 141
Roper rightly feared that jurors could not distinguish between a youth's diminished
responsibility for causing the harm and the harm itself. Although Miller/Jackson
requires individualized culpability assessments, the Court did not identify any
factors to indicate the heightened culpability that would justify an LWOP sentence.
There exists a more straightforward, objective sentencing policy alternative to
subjective speculation about youths' culpability. A categorical Youth Discount
would provide adolescents with substantially reduced sentences based on age-as-a-
proxy for culpability." 9 The Youth Discount would give the largest sentence
reductions to the youngest, least mature offenders based on a sliding scale of
diminished responsibility.160  On a sliding scale keyed to developmental
differences and diminished responsibility, the maximum sentence that a fourteen-
year-old offender received would be substantially reduced from that which an adult
would receive-e.g. no more than twenty or twenty-five percent the length. The
juvenile offenders lacking an adult's culpability are not sentenced to die."). Roper, 543 U.S. at 573
(recognizing that "the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower
mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's
objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe
than death."). The heinousness of a crime almost invariably trumped jurors' assessments of a
youth's immaturity. Brink, supra note 30, at 1581; Simona Ghetti & Allison D. Redlich, Reactions
to Youth Crime: Perceptions of Accountability and Competency, 19 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 33, 45-47
(2001).
159 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 315-
21 (1999) (providing rationale for youth discount and describing its administration); Barry C. Feld,
Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 121-33 (1997) (providing rationale for categorical "youth discount")
[hereinafter Feld, Abolish]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 520-528
(1987) (arguing that proportional sentencing requires recognition of youths' reduced culpability). But
see Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40
HASTINGS L. J. 229, 233 (1989) (describing age as an imperfect proxy for a complex of factors,
"includ[ing] maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the capability to assess the possible
consequences of one's conduct," that constitute culpability); ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE,
supra note 30, at 150 (objecting to categorical youth discount because "age is an incomplete proxy
for levels of maturity during the years from age 12 to 18."). Zimring argues that "The variation
among individuals of the same age is great, and individualized determinations of immaturity are thus
superior to averages based on aggregate patterns." Id.
160 Feld, Abolish, supra note 159, at 118-21; see also Model Penal Code § 6.11 A(a) cmt. c
(providing that "offenders under 18 should be judged less blameworthy for their criminal acts than
older offenders-and age-based mitigation should increase in correspondence with the youthfulness
of individual defendants."); ELIZABETH S. Scorr & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE, 231 (2008) (arguing for sentences proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and
culpability of the offender and insisting that "immaturity and the harm of the offense should count,
such that younger offenders should be punished less severely than older youths . . ."); Scott &
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 27, at 837 ("[A] systematic sentencing discount for young
offenders in adult court[] might satisfy the demands of proportionality."); See also Zimring, Penal
Proportionality, supra note 59, at 288 (arguing that the penal law of youth crime should develop "a
sliding scale of responsibility based on both judgment and the practical experience of impulse
management and peer control");.
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maximum sentence a mid-adolescent could receive would be no more than half the
adult length. The substantially deeper discounts for the youngest offenders
correspond with their greater developmental deficits in judgment, self-control,
appreciation of consequences, and the like.'
A Youth Discount recognizes that same-length sentences exact a greater penal
bite from younger offenders than older ones.162 A judge would take the Youth
Discount off of the appropriate sentence that she would impose on an adult
convicted of the same crime. A Youth Discount incorporates the decreased
161 Brink, supra note 30, at 1572 ("[A] juvenile is less responsible for her crime than her adult
counterpart is for the same crime and . . . all else being equal, the younger the juvenile the less
responsible she is for her crime."); Zimring, Penal Proportionality, supra note 59, at 288
("[A]dolescents learn their way toward adult levels of responsibility gradually. This notion is also
consistent with ... long periods of diminished responsibility that incrementally approach adult
standards in the late teens . . . [and with] less-than-adult punishments that gradually approach adult
levels during the late teen years.").
162 The Court in Miller/Jackson struck down mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders because
"every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old . .
" Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012); see Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate
Sentences for Juveniles: How Different than for Adults?, 3 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 221, 227 (2001)
("A given penalty is said to be more onerous when suffered by a child than by an adult. Young
people, assertedly, are psychologically less resilient, and the punishments they suffer interfere more
with opportunities for education and personal development."); Arredondo, supra note 53, at 19
("Because of differences in the experience of time, any given duration of sanction will be
experienced subjectively as longer by younger children."); Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More
Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 21-22 (2002) (describing substantive quality of punishment adolescents
experience in adult incarceration as far harsher than the sanctions they experience as delinquents);
Feld, Abolish, supra note 159, at 112-13 ("[Y]ouths experience objectively equal punishment
subjectively as more severe.").
163 Because the length of an LWOP is indeterminate, states should apply a Youth Discount to a
presumptive life sentence length of about forty years-i.e. the average age at which adult murderers
enter prison and their projected, albeit reduced, life expectancy. See Alfonso A. Castillo, Guilty Plea
in Gruesome Murder Deal Slammed, NEWSDAY, Sep. 13, 2007, at A4 (noting that life expectancy of
prison inmates is shorter than that of the civilian population "because of unhealthy living conditions
and violence."); Cf Ernest Drucker, Population Impact of Mass Incarceration Under New York's
Rockefeller Drug Laws: An Analysis of Years of Lost Life, 79 J. URBAN HEALTH 5 (Sep. 2002)
(discussing the reduced life expectancies of prisoners in New York convicted of non-violent drug
offenses). By one estimate, the average age of murderers is about twenty-nine years. See Edward L.
Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide Cases and the Role of Vengeance, 32 J. LEGAL
STUD. 363, 367 (2003) (summarizing data on murder cases in thirty-three large urban counties). Data
from the United States Department of Justice reports that two-thirds (65%) of all homicide offenders
committed their crimes between ages 18 and 34. JAMES ALAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S., available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/teens.htm (graph entitled, "Homicide Type by Age, 1976-
2005") (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). Although the average life expectancy for children born today is
77.4 years, it is lower for men, for minorities, and significantly reduced for prison inmates who are
exposed to a variety of diseases. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ARIAS, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT.
VITAL STATISTICS REP.: U.S. LIFE TABLES, 2003 3 (last modified Mar. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_14.pdf.
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likelihood of recidivism with age and the increased costs of confining geriatric
inmates.'6
A Youth Discount would preclude LWOP, lengthy mandatory-minimum, or
virtual life sentences-e.g. lengthy consecutive terms of years. 165 As
Miller/Jackson foreshadows, "occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty will be uncommon."166  Shortly after Miller/Jackson, the
California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero held that a 110-year-to-life
sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of several nonhomicide offenses violated
Graham because it did not provide "a meaningful opportunity to obtain release."167
A lengthy mandatory minimum sentence that fails to take account of the mitigating
qualities of youth may violate Miller/Jackson 's injunction.168
' AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104, at 8; LABELLE, supra note 115,
at 22; NELLIS, supra note 90, at 33 (noting that before LWOP inmates grow old and die in prison,
"they will require substantially greater health care and medical services. Thus, life sentences add to
the rising geriatric prison population and place heavy financial burdens on states.").
165 AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 104, at 8 (recommending that states
abolish LWOP sentences for crimes committed by juveniles); MARC MAUER ET AL., THE MEANING OF
"LIFE": LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 32 (2004) (recommending categorical exemption of
juveniles from life sentences because they "represent an entire rejection of the longstanding traditions
of our treatment ofjuvenile offenders, which is that rehabilitation should be considered as a primary
objective when sentencing children"); MPC §6.1 IA(f) (recommending that for youth sentences, "The
court shall have authority to impose a sentence that deviates from any mandatory-minimum term of
imprisonment under state law."); SCorr & STEINBERG, supra note 160, at 246 (concluding that after
Roper, "youths also should be excluded from the criminal sentence of Life Without Parole
(LWOP)."); Wallace, supra note 76, at 53 (arguing that any lengthy term of years sentence denies
juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity to reenter society).
166 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; see also id. at 2489 (Alito J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for going "out of its way to express the view that the imposition of a sentence of life without parole
on a 'child' (i.e., a murderer under the age of 18) should be uncommon.").
167 People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012). In Caballero, the defendant was convicted
of three counts of attempted first-degree murder plus a consecutive term for firearm enhancement, all
of which were stacked consecutively to yield a sentence of 110-years-to-life. The California
Supreme Court rejected the state's claim that cumulative sentences that were not explicitly designated
as life without parole did not violate Graham's categorical rule with respect to juvenile nonhomicide
offenders:
[S]entencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a
parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender's natural life expectancy
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment ... [T]he
state may not deprive them at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
their rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in the future.
Id. at 295.
In setting a date for parole eligibility, the Caballero Court noted that "[u]nder Graham's
nonhomicide ruling, the sentencing court must consider all mitigating circumstances attendant in the
juvenile's crime and life, including but not limited to his or her chronological age at the time of the
crime, whether the juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, and his or her
physical and mental development, so that it can impose a time when the juvenile offender will be able
to seek parole from the parole board." Id.
168 See, e.g., Nilsen, supra note 86, at 69 (arguing that "[t]he expansion of an individualized
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Professional organizations and most academic analysts endorse the concept of
a Youth Discount.16 9 The American Bar Association criticized LWOP sentences
for juveniles and proposed shorter sentences for juveniles than those imposed on
adults, formally recognized youthfulness as a mitigating factor, and recommended
earlier parole release consideration. 70  The American Law Institute's revised
Model Penal Code sentencing provisions explicitly adopted the Youth Discount.
The MPC provides that when states sentence offenders convicted of crimes
committed prior to the age of eighteen, "the offender's age shall be a mitigating
sentencing requirement from the death penalty to life without parole for juveniles calls into question
any mandatory minimum sentencing for juveniles, because by definition such sentences do not afford
any discretion to the sentencer based on individual characteristics of the offender, then or in the
future.").
169 Several academic analysts have explicitly endorsed my proposal for the Youth Discount.
See, e.g., Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 109, at 697-98 ("We endorse Feld's proposals [for a youth
discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally different than adults and
that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less deserving of the
harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed on serious and violent adult offenders."); SCoTT &
STEINBERG, supra note 160 at 246 (concluding that "Proportionality supports imposing statutory
limits on the maximum duration of adult sentences impose[d] on juveniles-a 'youth discount,' to
use Feld's term."); Model Penal Code § 6.1 1A, Reporter's Note (acknowledging that the framework
of the MPC's recommendation for "specialized sentencing rules and mitigated treatment ofjuvenile
offenders sentenced in adult courts, owes much" to Feld's proposal for a Youth Discount-"a sliding
scale of developmental and criminal responsibility. . ."); von Hirsch, supra note 162, at 227 (arguing
for categorical penalty reductions based on juveniles' reduced culpability):
While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among youths of the same age,
the degree of appreciation we should demand depends on age: we may rightly expect
more comprehension and self-control from the 17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so that the
17-year-old's penalty reduction should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of
individualized determinations of a youth's degree of moral development would be neither
feasible nor desirable.
Id.
A study group funded by the National Institute of Justice determined that "[y]ouths' diminished
responsibility requires mitigated sanctions to avoid permanently life-changing penalties and provide
room to reform." James C. Howell, Barry C. Feld & Daniel P. Mears, Young Offenders and an
Effective Justice System Response: What Happens, What Should Happen, and What We Need to
Know, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND
PREVENTION 213 (RolfLoeber and David P. Farrington eds., 2012). Following the rationale of Roper
and Graham, it concluded that "[a] categorical rule of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing is preferable to individualized discretion. Id. at 229; DAVID P. FARRINGTON ET AL., Young
Adult Offenders: The Need for More Effective Legislative Options and Justice Processing, II
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 729, 743 (endorsing a "maturity discount" that provides a "decrease in
the severity of penalties that takes account of younger persons' lesser culpability and diminished
responsibility."). A few analysts supported the dissent in Roper and advocated for individualized
culpability assessments rather than a categorical approach. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text.
170 ABA, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION #105C 9 (policy adopted Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2008/midyear/updated-reports/hun
dredfivec.authcheckdam.doc.
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factor, to be assigned greater weight for offenders of younger ages."l 7' The MPC
recommends that sentencing and correctional authorities give priority to young
offenders "rehabilitation and reintegration into the law-abiding community" and
that judges have authority to impose blended sentences which give youths access
to juvenile programs rather than to prison.172
Although a small subset of chronic offenders may pose a heightened risk of
future recidivism, Roper observed that "[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption."' 3 Graham and Miller/Jackson recognized judges'
inability to identify high-risk individuals at the time of sentencing. The inability of
adolescents to participate effectively in criminal proceedings compounds this
difficulty. Ultimately, proportionality is a retributive concept, not a utilitarian
one,174 and Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson rest firmly on retributive
grounds-reduced culpability-after examining and rejecting utilitarian
justifications for punishment.175 Accordingly, there is no reason to disregard the
categorical mitigating role of youthfulness to speculatively incapacitate some
young offenders who may be deemed life-course persistent offenders. 76
"' Model Penal Code § 6.11 A (a).
172 Model Penal Code § 6.1 IA (b) and (d). Blended sentencing provisions allow a criminal
court judge to impose a juvenile sentence in lieu of a criminal disposition or to stay imposition of a
criminal sentence pending successful completion of a juvenile commitment. See generally, Feld &
Bishop, supra note 127, at 822-24 (explaining variations of blended sentencing provisions); Marcy
Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform, "Blended
Sentencing, " and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001)
(describing net-widening effects of juvenile blended sentencing, but approving criminal court
blended sentencing alternatives). The MPC proposes that a criminal court judge
may impose any disposition that would have been available if the offender had been
adjudicated a delinquent for the same conduct in the juvenile court. Alternatively, the
court may impose a juvenile-court disposition while reserving power to impose an adult
sentence if the offender violates the conditions of the juvenile-court disposition.
Model Penal Code at §6.11 A (d).
'73 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2004).
174 See generally Stinneford, supra note 60.
175 See supra notes 15, 87-90 and accompanying text; see also Lee, supra note 60, at 59
(noting that the Court in Coker v. Georgia struck down the death penalty for rape while
acknowledging that "it may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not
invalid for its failure to do so.").
176 But see Model Penal Code §6.1 IA (c) (providing that "When an offender has been
convicted of a serious violent offense, and there is a reliable basis for belief that the offender presents
a high risk of serious violent offending in the future, priority may be given to the goal of
incapacitation . . ."). Comment c. to the MPC recognizes utilitarian sentencing goals-
incapacitation-as a basis on which to override the mitigation due to adolescents' diminished
responsibility. While a small subset of serious and chronic offenders may be at heightened risk of
future offending, courts lack valid or reliable bases on which to predict future dangerousness.
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Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson emphasized that juveniles' personalities
are more transitory and less fixed, their crimes provide less reliable evidence of
"irretrievably depraved character," and "a greater possibility exists that a minor's
character deficiencies will be reformed."l 77 Because adolescence is a period of
rapid growth and transition, youths will change more quickly and to a greater
degree following conviction than would more hardened, older offenders. 7 8
Although rates of criminal behavior increase rapidly among males in their teenage
years, rates of desistance are equally high as youths mature into their early
twenties.17 9  States should avoid the iatrogenic consequences of immediately
incarcerating more malleable young offenders with adult offenders. 180
A Youth Discount enables young offenders to survive serious mistakes with
the possibility of a life in the future.' ' A Youth Discount imposes sentences that
"' Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
178 ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 82, observes that "the high
prevalence of offenses in the teen years and the rather high rates of incidence for those who offend
are transitory phenomena associated with a transitional status and life period. Because some degree
of criminal offending is normal for adolescents, major interventions may not be necessary to change
them and punitive sanctions may be counter-productive." Id.
'79 See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
2006 NATIONAL REPORT 71 (2006) (noting that "most of the youth who reported committing an
assault in the later juvenile years stopped the behavior, reporting none in the early adult years").
Criminologists have noted the phenomenon of adolescents' "spontaneous" desistance from
delinquency for decades. See e.g., MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
160-63 (1972) (reporting that almost half of youths desisted after a single offense, one-third desisted
after a second offense, and the seriousness of the present offense was not predictive of the next
offense); PAUL E. TRACY ET. AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN Two BIRTH COHORTS 104 (1990)
(reporting that 42 percent of youths desisted after one offense and an additional 28 percent desisted
after a second offense).
1so See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth
Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.: AN ANNUAL REVIEW 189 (1998) (noting that most states do not provide
age-segregated dispositional facilities for youths convicted as adults); MPC §6.11 A comment j.
(recommending prohibition on housing juveniles in adult institutions):
Youths are especially vulnerable to victimization in adult institutions, and are at greater
risk than adult inmates of psychological harm and suicide. They are often in need of age-
specific programming that is unavailable in adult institutions. Research indicates that
incarceration in adult prison substantially increases the risk that a young person will
reoffend in the future.
Id.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 118 (2001) (reporting that "young people placed in adult correctional institutions, compared
to those placed in institutions designed for youths, are eight times as likely to commit suicide, five
times as likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and 50 percent as likely
to be attacked with a weapon."); Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Youth in Prison and
Beyond, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 843, 846-51 (Barry C.
Feld & Donna M. Bishop, eds., 2012) (describing adverse consequences of confining youth in adult
prisons).
181 See ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 89-96; Franklin E. Zimring,
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hold juveniles accountable, manage the risks they pose to others, and provide them
with a meaningful opportunity to reform without extinguishing their lives.182 The
characteristics of youth that increase their propensity for wrongdoing-immaturity
and plasticity-also provide the mechanism for learning, growth, and change. The
child who committed a serious crime at fourteen or fifteen years of age is a very
different person than the adult incarcerated decades later.183  Under a Youth
Discount, young offenders eventually will return to the community and states
should provide them with "a meaningful opportunity" to reform as they mature.
VI. CONCLUSION
Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson recognized that "children are different"
and provided a rationale to categorically recognize youthfulness as a mitigating
factor. The Court used age-as-a-proxy-for reduced culpability because no better,
more reliable or accurate bases exist on which to assess culpability or individualize
sentences. The Court's independent proportionality analyses reflect a moral
judgment about how much punishment young offenders deserve. Roper and
Graham recognized that clinicians, judges, or jurors cannot quantify culpability
and feared that efforts to individualize sentences when no objective bases for doing
so exist could introduce a systematic bias that treats youthfulness as an
aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor. A substantial, categorical Youth
Discount of the sentences imposed on juveniles punished as adults provides a
sliding scale of severity that corresponds with the increasingly diminished
responsibility of younger offenders.
The Court has reached the outer limits of what it can accomplish through
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. A Youth Discount provides a reasonable
approximation of "what any parent knows"--kids are different and do stupid and
dangerous things because they are kids. The specific amount by which sentences
imposed on youths should be substantially discounted is a political and legislative
value choice. Although some legislators may find it difficult to resist the
temptation to engage in penal demagoguery, 184 states can achieve all of their
legitimate penal goals by sentencing youths to no more than twenty or twenty-five
Background Paper, in CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 27, 66-69 (1978).
182 See ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 81-83, 142-45; Zimring,
Penal Proportionality, supra note 59, at 283-84.
183 Adolescents' personalities are in transition, and it is unjust and irrational to continue
harshly punishing a fifty-or sixty-year-old person for a crime that an irresponsible child committed
many decades earlier. Streib & Schrempp, supra note 143, at 12 ("To decide today whether or not
this adolescent offender should continue to be imprisoned into those adult years and even into old age
is to assume extrahuman powers to predict human behavior generations into the future.").
184 Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics and Juvenile Justice, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1447 (2003)
(describing the politicization of crime policies and politicians' use of racial code words for electoral
advantage).
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years for even the most serious crimes.' 85
It will take political courage for legislators to enact laws that recognize the
diminished responsibility of serious young offenders. It will take even greater
political courage when an opponent may charge a legislator with being "soft on
crime." The crime panic of the 1990s precipitated a host of "get-tough" waiver
and criminal sentencing laws that produced unjust and counterproductive
outcomes. The legislators who enacted them are obliged to undo the damage and
adopt sensible and rational juvenile sentencing laws. The Court's jurisprudence of
youth, greater understanding of adolescent development, public support for less
punitive policies,'86 and low crime rates may enable legislators to adopt a Youth
Discount that reflects "what every parent knows."
85 See, e.g., Model Penal Code, §6.1 LA (g) (providing that "[n]o sentence of imprisonment
longer than [25] years may be imposed for any offense or combination of offenses. For offenders
under the age of 16 at the time of commission of their offenses, no sentences of imprisonment longer
than [20] years may be imposed. For offenders under the age of 14 at the time of commission of their
offenses, no sentence of imprisonment longer than [10] years maybe imposed.").
86 Public opinion supports policies to rehabilitate serious young offenders to reduce future
crime rather than simply to incarcerate them for longer periods. BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN
MARCHIONNA, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD YOUTH CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2007),
available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/zogbyfeb07.pdf (reporting strong public support for
rehabilitation as a strategy to prevent and reduce juvenile crime); Brink, supra note 30, at 1585
("There is support for treating youthful offenders as juveniles and for sentencing that is rehabilitative
. . . "); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Public Preferencesfor Rehabilitation versus Incarceration of Juvenile
Offenders: Evidence from a Contingent Valuation Survey, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 627, 644
(2006) ("[M]embers of the public are concerned about youth crime and want to reduce its incidence,
but they are ready to support effective rehabilitative programs as a means of accomplishing that
end-and indeed favor this response to imposing more punishment through longer sentences.");
Donna M. Bishop, Public Opinion and Juvenile Justice Policy: Myths and Misconceptions, 5
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. PoL'Y 653, 656-57 (2006) (summarizing survey results of public opinion
regarding support for rehabilitation); Francis T. Cullen, It's Time to Reaffirm Rehabilitation, 5
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 665, 666-68 (2006) (reporting the continuing public support for idea of
rehabilitation, and offering that rehabilitation provides a cultural and criminological alternative to
simply locking up offenders).
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